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PANEL ON FEDERALISM IN PRACTICE
NATIONAL AND LOCAL PERSPECTIVES ON
STATES' USE OF CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE
UNDOCUMENTED OR UNAUTHORIZED
MIGRATION*
In November 2010, the Journal hosted a panel on Federalism in
Practice as part of its Fall Symposiu m .

Below is a transcript of the

discussion which took place at Loyola University New Orle ans College
of Law.

This transcript consists of the speakers' remarks along with

audience participation and questions.

The Journal has attempted to

preserve the character and substance of the discussion.

While this is

not a traditional Article, the Journal felt that it would be fitting to
include in our Spring volume.

PROFESSOR ANDREA ARMSTRONG [MODERATOR]: This panel is

going to take a slightly different approach to the same issue discussed in the
first panel, namely the intersection of state criminal law and immigration
law. Instead of presenting prepared papers, we have three fantastic experts
on this panel and we've asked each of them to r eflect for five to ten minutes
on the intersection of state criminal law and immigration law from their
unique perspectives and then we'll begin our roundtable discussion.

After

that point, we'll also be looking to you, the audience, for questions.
First, let me introduce each of the panelists.

Professor Diamond is

currently the Jules F. and Frances L. Landry Distinguished Professor of
Law at Louisiana State University Law Center.

Prior that appointment he

was a professor at Tulane University Law School here in New Orleans,
where he held the John Koerner Professorship in Law, and was previously
the C.J. Morrow Research Professor of Law, and was an Adjunct Professor
for African Diaspora Studies.

His expertise is widely known and his

scholarship has touched on a variety of these issues. What may be
interesting for some of you is that his scholarship most recently has looked

*

In an effort to preserve the unique character of the panel, the editors have reprinted the text of

the speakers' remarks essentially as delivered.

To assist the reader in understanding the text,

however, the editors and speakers have provided references to authorities that are central to the
debate.
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at the Second Amendment and he has been cited by the Supreme Court in
its recent Second Amendment jurisprudence.
Next, we will hear from Professor Eagly, who is an Acting Professor
of Law at University of California, Los Angeles Law School. She teaches
Evidence and the Criminal Defense Clinic. She has an amazing public
interest background, working on criminal defense issues and immigration
issues, including receiving a Skadden Fellowship to work on immigrant
worker rights issues at the Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago and a
Soros Criminal Justice Fellowship to direct a domestic violence program.
Her scholarship has also appeared widely in the UCLA Law Review, the
Clinical Law Review, and the Northwestern University Law Review.
The last member of our expert panel is Professor Hiroko Kusuda, and
she is one of our golden own here at Loyola University of New Orleans.
Professor Kusada is a Clinical Professor of Immigration Law, assisting
student attorneys to gain essential skills in representing immigrants before
the Immigration Courts, the Board of Immigration Appeals, as well as in
the federal courts. She is also a Staff Attorney with the Catholic Legal
Immigration Network, which is a subsidiary of ·the U.S. Conference of
Catholic Bishops. She coordinates, in that capacity, a state-wide detention
project which includes direct representation of detained immigrants, as well
as presentations on legal rights of immigrants. She's is a member of the
Executive Board for the American Immigration Lawyers Association and is
a frequent guest speaker on the pressing issues of immigration.
We'll hear from each of the experts in the order they were introduced
and then begin our discussion. Professor Diamond?
Well, thank you very much,
and I hope my time doesn't begin right away, because I need to say "thank
you" first, to the Journal for having this symposium; secondly, to Professor
Medina for inviting me; and, thirdly, to all of you for welcoming me back
someplace where I feel at home. You may know that I have taught here at
Loyola as an adjunct on a couple of occasions, but what I know you don't
know is that when I studied for the bar exam way back in the last
millennium, it was in Loyola's library that I studied, so I always feel very at
PROFESSOR RAYMOND T. DIAMOND:

home when I come back to Loyola.
What I want to talk about today is in perh aps equal parts
, fiirst about
practica
· 1 cons1·deratto
· ns, but secondly about theory. There
·
1s
a prac tlca
.
.
.
· 1
cons1�erat10n he�e with respect to the poli ce enforcem
ent of SB I 070. It
unav01dably subjects persons lawfully in the cou ntry
to police stops. 1 It is
I. See ARIZ. REV. STAT.§ 11-1051(8)
(2010) ("For any I aw fu I stop
, detention or arrest made

·
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undoubtedly true that police stop people all the time. So the question is:
What is different about this particular burden, that when a person is
lawfully stopped and police have a reasonable suspicion that a person is not
in the country legally, that they should investigate that suspicion? What is
different is that such persons must be prepared to prove their status, and/or
to be arrested when they cannot do so, and that this burden will l i kely fall
on a class of individuals in the main, and almost exclusively, to be
distinguished by race and national origin.2
This burden is racial. Police will make their determinations as to
reasonable suspicion on the basis of appearance, on the basis of accent.
They are making a determination of reasonable suspicion on the basis of
national origin, something that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
considered to be coincident with race.3 So it seems to me that this burden is
not only racial, it is an invidious piece o f racial discrimination, and the
question that we have is whether the state can undertake this investigation
and these arrests consistent with a compelling interest. SB 1070 maintains
that the state has a compelling i nterest "in the cooperative enforcement of
4
federal immigration laws throughout all o f Arizona." As I will relate

by a law enforcement official or a law enforcement agency of this state or a law enforcement
official or a law enforcement agency of a county, city, town or other political subdivision of this
state in the enforcement of any other law or ordinance of a county, city or town or this state where
reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United
States, a reasonable attempt shall be made, when practicable, to determine the immigration status

of the person, except if the determination may hinder or obstruct an investigation. Any person who
is arrested shall have the person's immigration status determined before the person is released."
(emphasis added)).
2. See, e.g., Alicia E. Barron, Truck Driver Forced to Show Birth Certificate Claims Racial

profiling, AZ.FAMILY.COM,

Apr. 21 , 2010 ,

http://www.azfamily.com/news/91769419.html

(television news account of an Hispanic man stopped days before Arizona's governor signed
SBI070 into law, arrested, transported to immigration authorities, and forced to provide a birth
certificate before being released). As the Supreme Court explained in United States v. Brignoni
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), the "single factor [of] apparent Mexican ancestry," as was apparently
the case in this incident, "would [not] justify . . . a reasonable belief of' of alienage. Id at 885-86.
L ar ge numbers of native-born and naturalized citizens have the physical characteristics
identified with Mexican ancestry, and even in the border area a relatively small p roportion of
the m arc aliens. The likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high
enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but standing alone it docs not justify
stopping all Mexican-Americans to ask ifthcy arc alien s.

Id. at 866-87 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

3. See e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (discussing the Fourteenth
Amendment "[t]hese provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the
equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws").
4. 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 113 ("The legislature finds that there is a compelling interest in the
cooperative enforcement of federal immigration laws throughout all of Arizona. The legislature
declares that the intent of this act is to make attrition through enforcement the public policy of all
state and local government agencies in Arizona. The provisions of this act are intended to work
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shortly, I question, however, whether that is a compelling interest.
Presuming that the interest is compelling, the means chosen to

effectuate the interest must be narrowly tailored, and this means is not
5
Effectively, this is a race specific means, and in fact,

narrowly tailored.

there are race neutral means of carrying out this interest.

Such means

would be very burdensome on police and indeed, very burdensome on
every person in the state- if, for example, every person whether citizen or

non-citizen irrespective of race or national origin were subject to citizenship
6
examination. Yet, this would be a burden shared across racial lines. And
because of the nature of the burden as one shared by all, it is entirely

possible that Arizona's legislature would not undertake to impose this
burden. Instead, what we have is the state imposing the burden of what it

presumes is good governmental policy on Hispanics, a racially identifiable

minority and a very fine example of what Carolene Products denominated
7
as "discrete and insular minorities." As a practical consideration, then, I
don't think that this particular portion of the statute can be maintained

because, as a practical matter, it will involve invidious racial discrimination
that cannot be justified.

Now what I want to do, as well, and this gets into theory, is to

question whether it is any interest at all of the state to attend to the

enforcement of federal law respecting the presence or movement of any
person, whether citizen or alien, legal or not into the state from outside the

nation. I want to question whether it's any business of the states at all, not

simply whether the state has a compelling interest but whether the state has

any interest at all.

The best case

for Arizona that it

has

the power to

attend

to

immigration, to attend to movement of non-citizens in the state of Arizona,
8
can be made i n Article 1, Section 9, in what we refer to as the 1808 Clause.

The 1808 Clause provided that Congress would have no power until 1808

to prevent "[t]he Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the

together to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity
by persons unlawfully present in the United States.").
5. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (noting that

racial

classifications "are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further
compelling governmental interests").

�·

This is not to say that such police stops and inquiries would comport with 4th Amendment

requirements .
7. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
8. US
. . CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. I ("The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the
.
S tates now cx1st111g sh � ll think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress p1ior to the
.
'tear
one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such
lmportat1on, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.").
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9
States now existing shall think proper to admit."
At its very first
opportunity, Confless did undertake to end the African-slave trade effective
January 1, 1808.
Before January 1, 1808, all of the states regulated the
immigration of persons into the United States, and particularly with respect
II
to slaves.
Many of the states, from Massachusetts all the way down to
Georgia, either allowed or, in most cases, disallowed the importation of
12
Africans into the United States. North Carolina and Georgia, at one point,
9. Id.
1 0. ANNALS OF CONG. 1 806-1 807, 1 266- 1 270.

l l. See W.E.B. Du BOIS, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE 230-43 ( 1 896).
1 2. Several states, primarily in the North, banned the slave trade at early points after the
Constitution was proposed, and even before it was ratified by the necessary nine states. See Act of
Feb. 22, 1788, ch. 40, 1 78 8 N.Y. Laws (an act concerning slaves); Act of Apr. 4, 1 80 1 , 1 80 1 N.Y.
Laws (banning the import and export of slaves except for person previously owning slaves
undertaking a bona fide relocation to the state); Act of Mar. 25, 1 788, ch. 1 1 , 1 78 8 Mass. Acts
(Massachusetts bans slave trade); Act of Mar. 29, 1 788, ch. CXLIX, § 2, 1 78 8 Pa. Laws
(Pennsylvania manumits all slaves brought to the state by any resident or person intending
pennanent residence). Similarly, Connecticut banned the involvement of its residents in the slave
trade on October 9, 1 788, just months after the Constitution was ratified. See Act of Oct. 8, 1788,
1 788 Conn. Pub. Acts 368 (an act to prevent the slave trade), amended by 1792 Conn. Pub. Acts
41 2 (Connecticut strengthens penalties associated with the 1 78 8 act).

At about this point, South Carolina would embark upon a series of temporary bans on
importation of slaves that the state would continue to renew until it made the ban permanent in
1 803. See Act of Nov. 4, 1 78 8 , 1 788 S.C. Acts (banning importation of non-domestic slaves until
1 793); Act of Dec. 2 1 , 1 79 2 , 1 79 2 S.C. Acts (extended the 1 78 8 ban until 1 795); Act of Dec. 20,
1 794, 1 794 S.C. Acts (extended the ban until 1 797); Act of Dec. 19, 1 796, 1 796 S.C. Acts
(extended ban until 1 799). The ban on importation of slaves lapsed for a period of almost two
years until it was revived and extended. See Act of Dec. 20, 1 800, 1 800 S.C. Acts (reviving the
ban and extending it to 1 803). It was extended not only to all slaves of both foreign and domestic
source, but also to free persons of African descent. See Act of Dec. 20, 1 800, S.C. Acts (excepting
migrants with no more than ten slaves); see also Act of Dec. 1 9, 1 80 1 , 1 80 1 S.C. Acts (made
criminal penalties more stringent). But see Act of Dec. 18, 1 8 02, 1 802 S.C. Acts (provided that
the limitations on importation did not apply to citizens of other states in transit with slave property
to a third state). Finally in 1 803, the ban was made permanent. Act of Dec. 3, 1 803, 1803 S.C.
Acts (limited and made permanent the prohibition on slave importation to those originating in the
West Indies and South America, and limited the ban on importation of domestic slaves to those
without certificates of good character).
Less extreme than South C arolina, its immediate neighbor to the north would ban for one year
the import of slaves and indentured servants of African ancestry. See 1 794 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. II
(prevented the further importation and bringing of slaves and indented servants of colour into the
state). The state would limit the ban the following year, however. See 1 795 N.C. Sess. Laws ch.
XVI (North Carolina bans importation of slaves from the West Indies as well as the Windward
and Leeward Islands). By contrast, Georgia moved in 1 793 to bans importation of slaves from the
West Indies, the Windward and Leeward Islands, and Florida. See Act of Dec. 1 9, 1 793, 1 793 Ga.
Laws. The state extended the ban to all slaves five years later, with exceptions for persons
migrating to Georgia and for Georgians inheriting slaves from elsewhere. Act of Jan. 3 1 , 1 798,
1 798 Ga. Laws. By virtue of a provision in a new constitution ratified later that year, the ban on
impor tation of foreign slaves was made permanent. GA. CONST., art. IV,§ 1 1 .
Other states would act with finality. See 1 796 Md. Laws ch. LXVII,§ I (Maryland bans slave
impo rtation, with exceptions for migrants from other states); Act of Mar. 1 4, 1 798, ch.

3 80
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allowed the import�tion of Africans, but not West Indians or other slaves
from the New World.13 This was after slave revolts that became the Haitian

revolution.

Again, the states, all of them, regulated immigration in the

United States.

slaves
The states regulated the movement across state lines not only of
Illinois, and
but also of free blacks. 14 It is interesting that in 1860, Indiana,
state
Oregon all had limitations on movement of free black people across

black
lines, 15 and only in that year did Iowa end its restriction on
re to
legislatu
immigration.16 The Illinois Constitution of 1848 directed the
pass laws rohibiting importation of slaves as well as the migration of free
;
Negroes,' and in 1853 the legislature responded to that command.18 The

Indiana Constitutio n of 1851 had provided that "[n]o negro or mulatto shall
9
come into, or settle in the State, after the adoption of this Constitution."1
Oregon's 1859 Constitution forbade the entry of all Negroes whether free or
slave.

20

Thirty years earlier in 1830, Indiana, Illinois, and Ohio had mandated
1
b onds for good behavior of all free Negroes.2 New Jersey, a northern state,

w a s among slave states in the early 1800s, and there were limitations on

DCCXXVII,§12, 1798 N.J. Laws (New Jersey bans slave importation).

This is not to say that during this period the only immigration concerns the states had respected
slavery and race. Connecticut and South Carolina, for example, also passed laws banning the
transportation of convicts into their jurisdictions. See 1788 Conn. Pub. Acts 367 (an act to prevent
the importation of convicts); Act of Nov. 4, 1788, 1788 S.C. Acts (an act for preventing the
transportation of convicted malefactors from foreign countries into this state).
13. See id

14. Paul Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment: Black Legal Rights in the

Antebellum North, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 415, 415-82 (1986).

15. Act of F eb. 12, 1853 (forbidding migration of free Negroes into Illinois, providing for
.
fines and expulstons for v10lation of the prohibition, and for sale at auction for those unable to pay
fines); IND. CONST. of 1851, art. XIII (prohibiting all Negroes whether slave or free from entry);
OR. C ONST. of 1859, art. XVIII (prohibiting all Negroes whether slave of free from entry). See
_
also Fmkelman
supra note 14, at 439.
,
16. See Finkelman, supra note 14, at 432.

17. ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. XIV.
18. Act of �eb. _ 12, 1853 (forbidding migratio n of free
Negroes, providing for fines and
expulsi_ons for vtolation of the prohibition, and for sale
at auction for those unable to pay fines).
19. IND. CONST. of 1851, art. Xlll.

20. OR. CONST. of 1859, art. XVIII.
21. Act of Jan 17 1829 ' 1829 Ill Rev. Laws
I st Spec. Sess. 1-4· Act of Feb I 1831 1833
·
Ind. Rev. Laws l · Act of Jan 25 1807 oh· o
en.
G
A
ssem. Laws 1-5, repealed by Act of Feb. IOI.
,
1849 Ohio Laws 17-18· A;
c f pr 13 /8
1827
Mich. �ev. Laws l st & 2nd Councils 1-10,
amended by Act of Jun� 2 3 1 28 l S28M'ic . rd
leg. Council lst sess. 1-2. The amendment was
repealed in 1933. 1833-34 Mich Laws 12
58, and the underlymg statute was repealed
in 1837. See
also Finkelman, supra note 14, �t
434.
·

'

'

�

A

�\

·

·

'
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22
movement of blacks into New Jersey, as well as other slave states.
This freedom to regulate immigration into their territory is what that
23
the states lost, in my estimate, with the Fourteenth Amendment.
The
Dred Scott case infamously said to us that "[Negroes) had no rights which
24
the white man was bound to rcspect,"
but it also was the first judicial
25
determination of the limits of citizenship,
and Chief Justice Taney's
opinion in the case determined that people of African descent were not
contemplated by the framers as citizens, and that while the states could
citizenship, Negroes were permanently barred from
26
citizenship status.
Now the Fourteenth Amendment defines citizenship,
recognize state

22. Finkelman, supra note 14, at 434.
23. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside.

No State shall make or enforce any law which shal l abridge the privileges or

im munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.").
24. Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856).
25. See MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 53

(2006).

26. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. 393. "In effect, Chief Justice Taney maintained that blacks, regardless
of their status as free or slave, were mere inhabitants of the United States, never to be citizens, id.
at 418-19, even if a state independently granted them citizenship, id. at 405-06.

In reaching his

conclusion, Chief Justice Taney gave emphasis to the mass of discriminatory state legislation and
constitutional law limiting the rights of free blacks. Id. at 412-16. See also L. LITWACK, NORTH
OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790-1860 (I 961 ). Chief Justice Taney ignored

or otherwise deliberately dismissed a body of politically and physically liberating legislative and
constitutional law that both free and slave states had adopted in the wake of the American
Revolution-law that had cast doubt upon the legitimacy of the point that the Chief Justice was
making.

See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 564, 572-76 (Curtis, J., dissenting); see also

Diamond

&

Cottrol,

Codifying Caste: Louisiana's

Racial

Fourteenth Amendment, 29 LOY. L. REV. 255, 260-62 (1983).

Classification

Scheme and the

The citizenship vel non of free

blacks under the 1787 Constitution as unamended is not the subject and is beyond the scope of this
Article. Yet, it must be pointed out that Chief Justice Taney's opinion regarding the citizenship of
blacks was not shared by a majority of the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Taney's opinion was
styled 'the opinion of the court,' Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 399, but it was joined in full
only by Justice Wayne, who saw fit to write his own opinion nonetheless. Id. at 454.

Justice

Daniel wrote his own opinion and did not join at all in the Taney opinion, but agreed with the
Chief Justice on a point for point basis. Id at 469. Four Justices, Grier, Nelson, Campbell, and
Catron, agreed with the result as announced by Chief Justice Taney, but did not reach the issue of
citizenship. Id. at 457 (Nelson, J., concurring); id. at 469 (Grier, J., concurring); id. at 494
(Campbell, J. concurring); id. at 519 (Catron, J., concurring). Two Justices, McLean and Curtis,
dissented with respect to both the result and the issue of citizenship. Id. at 529 (McLean, J.,
dissenting); id. at 564 (Curtis, J., dissenting). Thus, only three members of the Court had declared
that blacks were outside the Constitution because of their race, and two members had dissented
vigorously. This alignment hardly constituted a finn national consensus on this issue." Raymond
T. Diam ond, No call to Glory: Thurgood Marshall's Thesis on the Intent of a Pro-Slavery
Constitution, 42 V AND. L. REV. 93, n.108 (1989).
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by its very terms-a person is a citizen who was born in the United States
or who is naturalized, and is a citizen of the state in which that person
27
Under the terms of the 14th Amendment, the rights and
28
privileges of citizens of the United States are protected, and one of those
resides as well.

privileges is movement across state lines, protected if not under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment, then by that
29
I would make the argument that if it

Amendment's Due Process Clause.

is so, then the power states exercised before the Fourteenth Amendment to
regulate immigration and movement of noncitizens into their territory, was
lost by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A question raised for practitioners of the political arts is whether
3°
Congress will exercise its power under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment
to explicitly override efforts like those in Arizona and what has been
31
The further question is whether there will be

proposed here in Louisiana.

congressional efforts to empower the states to u ndertake laws like this-a
32
questionable undertaking -or whether Congress will

constitutionally

simply leave the issue to the courts by standing silent.
PROFESSOR ANDREA ARMSTRONG [MODERATOR]: Thank you very

much Professor Diamond. Professor Eagly?
PROFESSOR INGRID EAGLY: I want to start out by thanking Loyola

University New Orleans College of Law, Professor Isabel Medina, and the
Journal of Public Interest Law for inviting me to participate in this
conversation today.

It is wonderful to be a part of this symposium which

addresses the critical intersection between immigration law and c riminal
law.

Because this area of law is so rapidly changing, it is particularly

important to address the policy issues that are at stake.

27. U.S. CONST. amend.
702-03

(1898).

28. U.S. CONST. amend.

XIV, § I. See also

United States v. Wo1w
Kim Ark. 169 U.S.
e

649.
·

XIV, § I.

29. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502-05 (1999); Edwards v. California,
314 U.S. 160. 178-80
( 1948). The holding in these two cases are certainly consisten t with dicta in The
Slaughterhouse
Cases, 83 U.�. 36 (1872), t� the ffe�t that privilege s
and immunities protected by the 14th
�
Am �ndment mclude those nghts . which owe their
existenc e to the Federal government ' its
Nationa l character, its Constitution, or its laws." Id. at
79.
30. _ "T � Congress shall have power to enforce, by
approp riate legislation, the provisions of
.
this article. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 5.

�

31. See H.B. 1205, Reg. Sess. (La. 2010).
32. Congress has n� power to authorize states
to violate the Constitution. "Certa inly all those
who have framed wntten constitutions contem
plate them as forming the fundamental and
paramount law �f the nation , and consequently
the theory of every such government must be
' that
an act of the legislature, repugnant to the
constitution, is void." Marbury v. Madis
on , 5 u . S . 137 ,
177(1803).

2011]
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Immigration crime is now the most prosecuted crime in our federal
It is not just the most prosecuted crime, but it
33
actually constitutes over half of the federal criminal docket.
Noncitizens
criminal justice system.

are now

of all defendants being sentenced under the Federal
34
Sentencing Guidelines.
If we were to add in those who were sentenced to

40%

petty crimes and magistrate courts, the percentage of noncitizen defendants
35
would be even higher.
As the panelists this morning have already begun to document, for
some time we have not just been seeing the increased criminalization of
migration in the federal system, but we have also been seeing similar shifts
at the state level.

Arizona's Senate Bill

1070,36

which was talked about

earlier today, is being hotly contested in the courts and we do not
37
SB 1070
necessarily know how that litigation will ultimately be resolved.

is by far the most common example of this criminalization trend and the
one that has received the most media attention.
If SB

1070 were

ever fully implemented in the courts, it would do a

number of things. Essentially, it would grant local law enforcement officers
broader authority to stop individuals to ask questions regarding immigration
38
status and make arrests for violations o f the immigration law.
It would
also create certain new crimes-such as failing to carry alien registration
papers and working without authorization to be legally present in the United
39
The explicit p urpose of the law is to enforce immigration: to

States.

borrow the language o f the statute itself,

"to make attrition through

enforcement the public p olicy of all state and local government agencies in
40
But, SB 1070 is only one such law and there are a number of

Arizona."

other laws that were passed previously in Arizona and in other states.

In

addition, a number of "copy cat" bills have been proposed or adopted in the
wake of SB

1070.

As we launch into our panel discussion, I want to provide a brief

33. Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosec uting Immigration, 104 NW.

U. L. REV. 1281, 1281-82 (2010).

34. Id. at 1282 n.5.
35. Id. at 1288.
36. 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1070, amended by H.B. 2162, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz.
2010).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (preliminarily
enjoining enforcement of many provisions of S B l 070). The district court decision is currently on
appeal to the Ninth Circuit. See United States v. Arizona, No. 10-16645, 2010 WL 5162508 (9th
Cir. 2010).

38. See, e.g., Sec. 2(B), amending ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 11-1051(8) (2010).
39. Sec. 3, adding ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509 {2010); Sec. 5, adding ARIZ. REV. STAT.

ANN. § 13-2928(C) (2010).
40. S.8. 1070, 49th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. § l (Ariz. 2010).
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conceptual sketch of what these emerging state laws contain so that we can
start to understand in more detail how they are actually being used to
enforce migration.

Broadly speaking, these laws can be broken down into

three general categories: substantive criminal laws, proce dural court rules,
and laws and policies that affect law enforcement authority.
In regard to the first category, we have state laws that actually
criminalize alienage-related offenses or conduct that we associate with

A number of states have passed laws that actually require

immigration.

proof of alienage as an e lement in a crime.
alien

gun

possession,

driving

while

They include crimes such as

undocumented,

working

while

undocumented, and various document-related fraud crimes, such as using
41
false documents to conceal one's alien status.
A number of states have
also adopted smuggling, trafficking, or harboring crimes, some of which
42
require proof of alienage as an element.
We are also seeing a wider use of state and local criminal laws that
have been on the books for a long time to target acts that are perceived to be
associated with illegal migration. For example, laws criminalizing driving
without legal permission can, in practice, be used to prosecute those who
43
lack a driver's license as a result of their immigration status.
With regard to the second category, we are seeing an expansion of
state procedural rules that treat noncitizen defendants differently from
citizens.

Some

of these rules can be

described as curtailing

rights.

Consider, for example, laws that create a presumption against granting of
44
Other rules require judges,
bond to those perceived to be undocumented.

41. See, e.g., CAL.PENAL CODE§ 114 (West Supp. 2010) (making it a felony punishable by

� years '.n prison or a fine of $25,000 to use false documents to conceal one's true cit izenship or
res1d �n� ahen status); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.360 (2006) (making it a felony for a person

fiv

who ts 1llegally or unlawfully in the United States to possess a firearm); 18 P A.CONS. ST AT. ANN.
§ 6 l 05(c)(S) (West 2000) (prohibiting aliens and persons illegally in the United States from
possessing, using, or selling firearms).
42 See, e.g., Cow. REV. STAT.§ 18-13-128 (2009) (making it a felony to, "for the purpose of
:
_
ass1stmg another person to enter, remain in, or travel through the United States or the state
of
Colorado in violation of immigration laws, . ..provide[) or a gree(] to provide transportati
to
on
.
that person • n ex hange for money or any other thing of value"); FLA. ST AT. ANN
.
§
787.07
(West
.
.
2007) (makmg 1t a misd m�anor to "transport(] into this state an individual
who the person
knows, or should know, ts illegally entering the United States
from another country)· OKLA .
.
ST�T. tit. 21§ 46 (Su P· 2010) (making it illegal to transpor t,
conceal,or harbor aliens " nowing
or m reckless d sregard , of the fact that they entered or remain
in the United States illegally).
43. See Juha Preston & Robert Gebeloff, Unlicen
sed Drivers Who Risk More Th ana F.me,
N.Y.TIMES,Dec.10,2010, atAI .

�

�

�
�

�

k

44. Arizona's new bond law is particularly restrict
ive. It mandates the detenti on without
bond, of defendants charge d with "serious felony
· th
offenses" who have "entered or remamed m
e
,
·t d States 1·11egaII y. Anz.Prop. 100 (2006)
Ume
(HCR 2028) 'amend.mg ARIZ. CONST. art.
22
II,§
.
& ARIZ. REV. STAT ANN § 13-3961 (2010)
, avatlable at http://www .azsos.gov/e
lection/2006/
·

,

·

·

·

'
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corrections officers, and other law enforcement officers to investigate

immigration status and make reports to federal authorities of people who
45
are suspected of being deportablc.
The third category includes those state and local laws that generally

expand the authority of local police and other law enforcement officers to

investigate immigration-related offenses and to refer people to federal

authorities.

Essentially, these laws allow

local police to

engage in

immigration screening as part of their routine police work on the ground.

Some states have passed laws preventing localities from adopting policies

that would limit the authority of officers to enforce immigration l aw while
46
engaging in routine police enforcement activities.
We are also

increasingly seeing states engaging in cooperative agreements with the

federal government.

For example, under the so-called 287(g) program,

local police officers and correctional officers screen for immigration status
47
with the support of federal funding.

I think it is important to provide this brief sketch of the laws that

support the criminal immigration enforcement scheme at the local level as a

first step to understanding how these laws operate in practice. As compared

to the federal criminal justice system, which is relatively standardized

across the country, we know much less about state and local criminal justice

systems.

Therefore we know less about the defendants who are actually

being charged under these new laws. We also know less about how these

new procedural rules are actually being implemented in practice.

Finally,

we know less about what is happening to people who are arrested and then
referred to immigration without fust being criminally prosecuted.
Some of the laws that have been passed recently may ultimately be
found to be preempted. However, others may remain viable. As a result, it

is important as we move forward to begin to understand how these laws

actually function in practice so that policymakers can more effectively

info/pubpamphlet/english/Prop I 00.htm.
45. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-29-103(2)(a)(I) (2009) (requiring that "[a] peace officer
who has probable cause that an arrestee for a criminal offense is not legally present in the U nited
States . . . report such arrestee to [ICE]"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A § 3043(1) (1988)
(requiring officials at correctional facilities or private institutions supported by public funds to
inquire into the nationality each person admitted there, and if it appears that the person is an alien,

to notify ICE of the date and reason for admission, the length of confinement, the country of
which the person is citizen, and the date the alien entered the United States); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
577.680 (West Supp. 2010) (directing all state and local law enforcement agencies to verify with
OHS the immigration status of all individuals charged with a crime and jailed).
46. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § l l-105l(A) (2010) (prohibiting Arizona officials,
agencies, and political subdivisions from limiting enforcement of federal immigration laws).
47. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006).
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evaluate their effects on criminal process.
PROFESSOR ANDREA ARMSTRONG [MODERATOR): Thank you very

much, Professor Eagly. Professor Kusuda?
PROFESSOR HIROKO KUSUDA: Again, I would like to thank you,

Professor Medina, and the Journal for allowing me to be on this wonderful
panel.

I would like to speak my perspective as an immigration attorney

who represents people in court proceedings and before the administrative
agencies and see that we already face criminalization of immigrants on a
daily basis.

I just wanted to reiterate the issue that other panelists have

pointed out, which is a cost to the state to attempt such a vast undertaking in
regulating the behavior of a noncitizen or alleged non-citizens.
know, Arizona's SB

1070

48

As you

is being litigated in courts, and s o

apparently, at the cost to the state of Arizona over

$1,000,000

49

far,
and

Governor Brewer apparently has set aside $500,000 more for future
so
litigation purposes.
According to recent reports, the legislators of Utah,
where recently a copy-cat bill was introduced, came down to Phoenix to
investigate whether or not this proposed Utah bill would impact their own
jurisdictions and the state in general, and they wanted to assess the
st
economic impact of that bill.
And the Phoenix Chamber of Commerce
gave them a devastating presentation basically saying that the total
estimated cost will be over

$90,000,000;

s2

as a result, several conferences

have been cancelled based upon the negative press.
The other states have been proposing, and have attempted to pass
similar bills. A similar bill was introduced i n Louisiana in a last legislative
session in spring.

House Bill 1205 was i ntroduced by representative

Harrison, titled "Louisiana Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 201O,"
s3
which is an 18-page bill.
Unfortunately, h e ' s not going to be here today to
discuss this bill, but we actually went to a legislative session this past spring

48. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. § I (Ariz. 20 I 0).
49. Howard Fischer, Cost of Defending SB 1070 Tops $1 M, EAST VALLEY TRIBUNE, Oct. 27.
2010,
http://www.eastvalleytribune.com/arizona/immigration/article- I ff68ba2-e243- l t df-bc3eOO I cc4c002e0.html.
�0. Ginger Rough, Fun Tied to SB 1070 Nears $500,0
00, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 9, 2010,
.//www.azcentral.com/anzonarepubhc/loca l/articl es/20 I
0/07/09/20 I 00709dcfensefund0709.ht

�

���

51. Nicole Gonzalez, Utah leaders Find Immig
ration law Could Impact Economy, DESERET
Se� t. 30, 2010, ht tp://www.deseretnews.com
/article/700069718/Utah-leaders-fiind-:1mm1gra
a·on·
law-could-impact-economy.html.

NEWS,

Alicia E. Barron, Boyc otts Over SB-10
70 Could Cost Phoenix Up to
$90 Million
May 11, 2010 , http://www .azfamily.co
m/outbound-feeds/yahoo-ne ws/Boycotts�
over-1mm1grat1on-law-could-cost-Pho
enix-up-to-90-million-93489339.html
.
53. H.B. 1205, !st Reg. Sess. (La. 2010
).

AZ

Si.

·

� �
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and tried to discuss this bill with the representative. We were successful in

persuading the judiciary committee to pull the bill because the cost
implication was huge to the state of Louisiana.

That said, I ' m going to move onto the legislative attempt to introduce

similar bills, and the second point I wanted to make is our public safety
issue.

The advocates of such bills are saying that immigrants ' behavior

jeopardizes public safety of the citizens of the state. We encounter people
in all kinds of situations, many of whom are crime victims such as domestic

violence. These people are commonly afraid to call the police because of
lack of immigration status. And, one of the cases that we had a couple of

years ago was of a family of five, a mother was heavily beaten up and taken

to an emergency room and the hospital actually called us.

They had

nowhere else to go, and they were afraid to go back to their house, and we

eventually were able to rescue the entire family by fi l ing a so-called
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act54 petition, which was

ultimately successful and regularized their status, however, because of the

fear they had, they could not go to the authorities seeking protection from

the abuser; a U.S. citizen.

Another example we 've encountered at the Loyola Law Clinic was a

case of immigrant workers who were burglarized, some of whom were
murdered in an attempt to rob them. They were the victims of a crime but

because they were undocumented workers l iving i n a trailer, they were held

in a parish jail for over six months as material witnesses because the

prosecutor didn ' t want them to be deported by the federal authorities.

So

the witnesses were kept in jail and could not communicate with anyone

else. Through different sources we were able to find them and represent
them in immigration proceedings, and eventually we were able to help them
obtain U visas which provides protection for victims of serious crimes. 55

When you talk about public safety, when people are victimized but

cannot come out to seek protection from law enforcement officials-it' s a

serious problem.

W e understand noncitizens do commit crimes, but they

also become victims, and when they have no voice in the system, it is a
serious problem for us and the community as a whole.

54. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 1 06-386, 1 1 4
Stat. 1464 (2000). See also William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 1 1 0-457, 1 2 2 Stat. 5044 (2008) ("TVPRA") .

In addition to expanding

protections for trafficking victims generally, the TVPRA made procedural and substantive
changes to immigration legal relief for unaccompanied alien chi ldren. Specifically, Section 235 of
the TVPRA increased many protections for unaccompanied alien children seeking relief from
removal, including Special Immigrant Juvenile status and asylum.
55. See U Visa for Immigrants who are Victims of Crimes, U.S. IMMIGRATION SUPPORT
(201 0), http://www. usimmigrationsupport.org/visa-u.html.
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Also, there is another argument that advocates for states advance-the
federal government is not doing its job, so w e are going to do it for them. If
you listened to the oral argument before the Ninth Circuit earlier this week
concerning the U . S . government's law suit against SB 1 070, you could hear
that the lawyer for the Arizona governor was arguing that the federal
government was not controlling illegal immigration behavior. He said
ing to do the best it can, but the
something along the line of-Arizona is
5
The j udge, Carlos Bea, asked
federal government is not doing the job.
this lawyer, saying

�

Is this your argument that a state can take a look at whether or not the
And if the federal
federal government is enforcing its laws?
government is not enforcing its laws, it can enforce the laws for the
federal government? For instance, if I don' t pay my income tax to the
federal government, can California come along and sue me for not
.
.
5
paymg my mcome tax?. 7
And the lawyer for the state didn't have an answer for that question. What
the judge was asking was exactly what states are saying they want to do,
can we do it if we feel the federal government is not doing its j ob of
regulating immigration law?
Arizona's argum ent that the federal government is not doing its j ob
does not make sense because the U.S. government has deported the highest
58
59
Almost 400,000 people
number of people in the fiscal year 2009-2 0 1 0 .
60
And a
have been deported from this country this past fiscal year.
61
staggering 2.6 trillion dollars have been allocated to spend on deportation.
According to Director John Morton of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, it will cost the U.S. government sixty-five billion dollars to
56. Watch Recording for Case: USA v. State ofArizona No. 10-16645£8, U.S. COURTS FOR THE
(2010), http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_subpage.php?pk vid=0000006 I I 7;
see also United States v. Arizona, No. 1 0- 1 6645, 20 1 0 WL 5 1 62508 (9th Cir� 20 1 0). The
case
history and pleadings are available at http://www .ca9.uscotrrts.gov/content/view.php?pk_id=0
0000470.
57. Court Hears A rizona Immigration Law Appeal, N A T ' L PUB. RADIO,
N ov. J , 20 1 0,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story. php?story Id= 1 3098280
9.
58. Peter Slevin, Deportation of Illegal Immigrants Increases
Under Obama
NINTH CIRCUIT

A dministration,

WASH. POST,

July 26, 20 1 0, http://www . washingtonpost .com/wp-dyn/c
ontent/artic le/20 1 0/07/25/
AR20 1 007250 1 790.html.
59. id.

60. Report: New Obama Budget Should Cut Spendin
g o n Failed Immigration Enforcement,
DEPORTATION NATION, Feb, 1 1 , 201 1 ,
http://www.de portationnation.org/2 01 1 /02/report-new
obama-budget-should-cut-spend1 ng-on-failed-immig
ration -enforcemcnt/.
61.
oses Apsan, Ma s Deportation Of illegal Immig
rants Cost $2. 6 trillion over ten years
�
_
mtgrati
o Refmm Solution
http://n
�
ews.jo
mal.us
/article-47 1 6.Mass-Deportation-Of'.
1 egal-Imm1grants-Cost-26-tn ll10n-over-ten-years
-Immigration- Reform-Solution html (1 ast v1s1
. 't ed
Mar. t , 201 1 ).

��

�
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deport an estimated number of ten million undocumented people in this
62
country.
So think about it, Louisiana is suffering from budgetary cuts, for
example, the costs of higher education are being seriously cut. Now we are
going to have to drastically increase the state budget in helping the federal
government to enforce federal law.
sense.

It seems to me it doesn' t make any

Louisiana is a state that is known to h ave a very low number of

foreign-born populations, but one of the highest number of immigration
63
We are known to be the highest receiving state

detainees in the country.

of the country, that ' s why we have four long-term immigration detention

centers. 64

And it is a well known fact that 90% of the population of

detainees is not represented by immigration lawyers.

PROFESSOR ANDREA ARMSTRONG [MODERATOR) : Thank you very
much.

Unfortunately, Representative Joe Harrison, who was slated to

appear today, had to cancel.

Representative Harrison has sponsored a bill

here in Louisiana that may be relevant to our discussion.

In h i s absence, I

would like to provide a very brief summary of the bill and hear reactions
from our expert panelists.
The Louisiana proposed Act, House Bill 1 205, is an act, relative to
immigration, to provide for the determination of citizenship status for
65
The act provides for the notification
persons charged with certain crimes.
to certain entities; it provides for the rebuttable presumption that c ertain
persons are a flight risk; provides for establishing certain d iscriminatory
practi ce; but also in one of the following clauses, provide for non
66
Perhaps Professor Diamond can help us
discriminatory treatment.
reconcile the interaction of those two separate provisions.
The stated purposes of the act might also be relevant.

The act is

required, according to the proposed bill, because "it is a compelling public
interest of this state to discourage illegal immigration by requiring all
agencies within the state to fully cooperate with federal immigration
67
auth orities in the enforcement of federal immigration laws."
Furthermore,
[t]he state of Louisiana further finds that when illegal immigrants have
been harbored and sheltered in this state and encouraged to reside in

62. Ruben Navarrette,

What is Immigration?,

RED, BROWN, AND BLUE, Dec.

I , 2010,

http://redbrownandblue.com/index.php/opinion-what-is-immigration.

63. Hiroko Kusuda, et al., Hurricane Katrina: 5 Years later, CATH LEGAL IMMIGR.
N ETWORK, INC., Aug. 27, 2 0 1 0, http://cliniclegal.org/blog/ I 008/hurricane-katrina-5-years-later.
.

64. The four detention centers are Oakdale Federal Detention Center, LaSalle Parish Detention

Center, Tensas Parish Detention Center and South Louisiana Correctional Center.

65. H.B. 1 205, ! st Reg. Sess. (La. 20 1 0).
66. Id.
6 7. § 1 3 1 2.
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this state through the issuance of identification cards that are issued
without verifying immigration status, these practices impede and

obstruct the enforcement of federal immigration law, underm ine the
security of our borders, and impennissibly restrict the privileges and

immunities of the citizens of Louisiana.

68

There are also several subsections of the proposed law and one o f the

largest sub-sections addresses the public benefits provided by agencies o f
the state. 69 This subsection requires that agencies verify the status o f the

people using those services and that a ffirmative proof of status may be
required.

Only a few exce tions are listed, such as emergency room
R

treatment and immunizations.

0

How do you verify your immigration status? Well, in the bill it says

that you fill out an affidavit, and it has to be notarized, and then that creates
71
The state will stil l send your information on for
a rebuttable presumption.

verification, but the affidavit appears to create a rebuttable presumption that
72
In addition, the
you have legal authorization to be in the United States.

bill also creates an additional criminal penalty for the filing of a false or
.
.
1 av1t. 7 3
mcorrect affid
There's a criminal section of the statute which would require police

officers to determine at the time of booking the immigration status of the
4
detainee. 7 The police should make a "reasonable effort" to verify that the

person has been lawfully admitted, and if they can't determine it at the time

of booking, depending on the documents that the person may have with

them, then the police must notify the Department of Homeland Security as
75
Note, there is discretion built into the statute.
soon as is practicable.

A few additional sections of note.
The proposed act contains a
relatively low criminal standard-reckless d i sregard-for the crimes of
unlawful assistance, unlawful harboring , and unlawful transport ation of
.
76 The act also puts a lot of effort into making contract
a I 1ens.
ors de facto
nfo cers of the act, suc h that contr tors are required to
veri fy the
�
�
.
'\�
.
1mm1grat10n status o f thelf
employees .
Last, the act require s a state
68. Id
69. § 1 3 1 4.
70. Id

7 1 . Id
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. § 1 3 1 5 .
75. Id.
76. § 1 3 1 7 .
77. § 1 3 1 9.
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university student t o prove their documented status in order t o receive the
preferential and lower resident tuition rate. 7x
So those arc a few highlights of the p roposed b i l l in L o u i s i ana.
would love to get our experts' take on a few of the provisions.

I

Maybe

Professor Diamond, if you could start us off with discussion?
PROFESSOR RAYMOND T. DIAMOND:

My first reaction

is that

Louisiana i s running, in many respects, the same play as Arizona is, and
one piece of the

play

is the exposition

of a compelling

interest in

cooperation

with the federal government with respect to federal
79
immigration law.
The doubt 1 would raise is that the state' s interest is not

as it argues it to be, cooperation with the federal government.

Instead the

state's apparent interest is to impose on the federal government state
priorities respecting immigration.

I woul d s uggest that this i s not, by any

stretch of the imagination, a compelling interest. It runs directly contrary to
the idea that all of us understand who have ever read the case McCulloch v.
81
80
means that
Maryland,
that the U . S . Constitution ' s Supremacy Clause
when

a

state policy runs contrary to a federal policy, when a state priority

runs contra 'iX to a federal law, it's the state policy or priority that falls to

federal law. PROFESSOR INGRID EAGLY: I have a brief comment on the structure
83
of the proposed Louisiana bill.
It is a c omprehensive b i l l that includes
both civil and c r i minal provisions.

In many respects, the c i v i l provisions

mirror California Proposition 1 8 7, which was passed by voters during the
84
1 990s.
Essentially the Louisiana bill proposes that healthcare workers,
educators, and other public employees be converted into enforcers of
85
The criminal provisions o f the bill contain elements of

immigration laws.

all three types o f laws that I discussed during my brief comments.

In

particular, it contains substantive immigration crimes, procedural rules for

78.

§ 1 32 1 .

79. See generally H.B. 1 205, ! st Reg. Sess. (La. 20 1 0).

80. McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. 3 1 6. 405-407 ( 1 8 1 9).
8 1 . U.S. CONST. art. VI, c l . 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which

shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every

State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." ).

82. McCulloch perhaps most famously held that "the states have no power . . . to retard,
by
impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitution al laws enacted

[C)ongress . . . . " McCulloch, 1 7 U.S. at 436.

83. H.B. 1 205, 1 st Reg. Sess. (La. 20 1 0).

84. Cal. Prop. 1 87, 1 994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 1 87 (West).

85. H.B. 1 205, 1 st Reg. Sess. §§ 1 3 14, 1 32 1 , 1 3 1 9 (La. 20 1 0).
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noncitizens, and expanded immigration law enforcement authority.

86

PROFESSOR HIROKO KUSUDA: A criminal section of the Arizona bill

basically mandates the detention of persons until law enforcement officers
can determine the i m migration status o f that person.
troublesome to the Ninth Circuit panel.

This section was

I kind of sense that they were

concerned about how long a state authority can detain a person and at when
point it raises a red flag.

And the proposed Louisiana bill also says the

peace officer "shall" attempt to notify the United States Department of
87
Homeland Security as soon as practicable about the status of the citizen.
That should cause a big concern to us and everyone because it' s a
deprivation of liberty and freedom which is one of the constitutional rights
that every citizen in this country enjoys.
In practicality, the Department of Homeland Security can actually
issue a detainer to any person who is arrested under the suspicion that the
88
It' s called an

person is not in this country without lawful status.

immigration detainer, but it expires after forty-eight hours of arrest, and
after which the local sheriffs office has to make a determinatio n whether or
89
not the person' s going to be released.
If Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) doesn't come and take over the detainees' custody, the
jail has to release him; otherwise they would be subject to a lawsuit called a
90
writ of habeas corpus petition.
So, this is area of the law that is going to
be prone to a legal challenge if such law i s passed in this state, however, but
Louisiana has been successful in passing a similar law in the past.
I'd like to share a post-Katrina issue that immigrants faced in the
metropolitan area of New Orleans. Have you ever seen people working in
dusty uniforms with no face masks, or no uniforms, at damaged building or
gutting houses?

Those people were targeted i n post-Katrina New Orleans

under the

passed

law

by the Louisiana

legislature

in

2002, called

91
But
"Operating a Vehicle without Lawful Presence in the United States."
the euphemism of this statute is "Driving While Undocumented."

The

statute basically says that no alien student or non-resident alien shall
o perate a motor vehicle in the state without documentation demonstrating
92
that the person i s lawfully present in the U . S .
Although i t was on the

86. Id. §§ 1314, 1 3 1 5 , 1 317, 1327.
87. § 1315.
88. 8 C.F.R. § 287(d)(3) (West 201 l ).
89. Id.
90. Immigration Detainers A ompre
·
C
hens1ve
look, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR. (Feb. 28,
.
.
.
. ·
2 0 1 1 ), http./
/www .1mm 1grat1onpolicy org1JUS
· t facts
· -detainers-com
;·1 mm1· grat10n
·
prehensive-look.
91. LA. REV. STAT. ANN . § 14: 1 00.1
3 (2010).
92. Id.
·

-
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books since 2002, this law had never been enforced until Hurricane Katrina
arrived in this city.
In October of 2005 , police officers a l legedly trained by federal
officials,

were

instructed

to

enforce

this

particular

statute.

This

enforcement action led to several lawsuits attacking this statute in New
Orleans and also in Jefferson Parish. Both district court levels held that the
statute was preempted by federal law, which meant that the state cannot
enforce the immigration law as it is within the federal power.
As Professor Diamond stated the statute, on its face, is race-neutral .
One of the Orleans Parish cases held that the actual enforcement part of it
was race-based. The Orleans Parish Criminal District Court Judge Hunter,
during the trial which I was observing, took over the cross-examination of
the police officer who arrested this worker, and asked, Officer Fagan, if he
93
The officer responded, he was

had received training in immigration law.

sent to "a one da immigration seminar i n early 2006 because, he ' spoke a
9l
little Spanish. ' "
The judge asked "[ w ] e l l , how do you know they are
95
The officer responded "[h]ow do I know?" The judge
illegal aliens?"
96
The
inquired "[h]ow do you know if a white driver is an illegal alien?"
97
officer responded "I'm not really sure how to answer that."
The court
98
then asked "[h]ow do you know if a black driver is an ille�al alien?"
The
9
officer said "I don 't know how to answer that one either."
The judge went
on to inquire about how the officer would fo ossibly know if an Asian,
1 0

Middle Eastern, or Indian was an i llegal alien.

So based on that conversation, the judge basically determined that the
statute was not only preempted, but its enforcement was based on the racial
profiling on the part of the police officer, so therefore the motion to quash
101
was granted.
Unfortunately, there were similar cases happening in
different parts of the state that resulted in criminal prosecution based on the
statute.

There is currently a circuit split as to the constitutionality of the

statute, and the issue has not been resolved by the Louisiana Supreme
1 02
Cour t.
But as far as Orleans Parish and Jefferson Parish are concerned,

93. Louis iana
94.

Id.

95.

Id.
Id.

96.

v.

Herrera, No. 467-763 (La. 2/1/06).

v.

Herrera, No. 467-763 (La. 2/ 1 /06).

97. Id.
98. Louisiana
99.
1 00.
IOI.

Id.
Id.
Id.

1 02. Compare State

v.

2/27/08 ); 997 So. 2d I , 7-8,
Gonzalez-Perez, 07- 1 8 1 3 (La. App. I Cir.

[Vo l . 1 2
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, bec au s e the Fourth C ircu it Cou rt of
the statute has not been enforced
dist rict c ourt that this law is clearly
Appeal upheld the deci sion s of the
1 03
re t e
However, East B aton Roug P rish, whe
preempted by federal law.
.
hty
of this
es, uph e l d the cons t1tut 10na
First Circuit Court of Appeal resid
lating
not
regu
is
04
siana
Loui
Basi cally the First Circu it held that
statute. 1
ay traffi c, and thus it i s w ithin the
imm igration, it is just regul ating highw
l l y operate a veh i c l e on a state
state' s power to deter mine who can lawfu
5
.
h 1gh way. 10

�

� �

this statut e was passed
I also want to provi de the backg round o f how
o f Terror ism on the
ention
in 2002, which i s interes ting. The title is "Prev
to '"enact laws
Highways," and i t states that the leg i s lativ e p urpose was
to use the
seek
who
which complem ent federal efforts to uncove r those
highways of this state to commit acts o f terror, and who seek to gain
driver's . licenses for the purpose of masking their il legal status in the
.
. .
.
.
'
,
i o6
It was d 1sappomtmg that we w e ren t aware th 1s I aw s existence .
state."

We learned from our experience that citize n s ' vigilance p layed an important

role in knowing this law i s on the book, a s we don 't always know what 's
going to happen

as

to

its

enforcement

in

other parishes.

Again,

unfortunately the Louisiana Supreme Court s o far has not taken up any
writs or appeals filed by the criminal defense bar.
PROFESSOR RAYMOND T. DIAMOND: Something strikes me about

the stated concern about terrorism.

It reminds one ve

rrc

Japanese exclusion and interment cases from World War I I ,

07

m uch of the
and what we

recall about those cases is that the Japanese citizens and Americans of
Japanese descent were subjected to curfews and to interment in World War
II, the reason being vital concern about nat i onal security.

The S upreme

Court accepted that this concern about national security during wartime,
concern about sabotage in the zone of t h e interior, did in fact constitute a

�

compelling interest, and t e court found that the means of subj ecting ethnic
Jap ane e to curfew and mtemment was narrowly tailored to the end of
.
108
.
m amtammg security.

�

The end of the story, however, i s not with the curfew s and the
·
rehearing denied 09-029 2 (La· 1 2/ 1 8/09)· 23
So. 3 d 93 0 (concluding
that law was not preempted
.
by tiederal law), with State v. Lopez, 05-0685 (La.
App.
4 Cir. 1 2/20/06 ) ·' 948 So ?d 1 p I 1 PS
.
'

.

(findmg law was preempted by federal law).
I 03. Lopez, 948 So. 2d at l l 2 5 .
1 04. Gonzalez-Perez, 997 So. 2 d at 7-8.

-

-

'

-

l 05. Id.

1 06. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1 4 : 1 00. 1 1 (20
1 0).
1 07. Korematsu v . Unite d States ' 323 U S
.
· · 2 1 4 ( I 944) : H i rabayash i
8 1 ( 1 943).
1 08. See Korematsu, 323 U . S . 2 1 4; Hirab
ayashi, 3 20 U . S . 8 1 .

v.

United States, 320 U.S.
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internment but that years later, it emerged that the government lied about
the national security interest . In fact, there was no concern about terrorism.
As a result, writs of coram nohis were granted in the case of Fred
Korematsu

1 09

. b ayas h.1 . 1
and G ord on H 1ra

10

s 1 m 1 1 arl y, one wonders whether
·

·

Louisiana has a true concern about terrorism, or i f this purported concern is
simply the vehicle for the state to do what it wants to do anyway with
respect to undocumented aliens.

Again, I don't know the answer, but I

think our history of Koramatsu and Hirabayashi suggests to us that we
ought to be concerned about what that answer i s .
PROFESSOR INGRID EAGLY: I would j ust add one more comment

regarding the proposed law.

As new substantive immigration crimes are

added to state criminal codes, there is l ittl e formal tracking of enforcement
levels. The federal government has a much better system of tracking of
enforcement levels of federal criminal statutes. But, at the state level, often
data is recorded by category of crime, rather than specific code section.
Louisiana i s one state, however, that has tracked enforcement of the
new immigration crime on its books--driving while undocumented.

111

I

submitted a Public Records Act request to the state of Louisiana regarding
enforcement of this 2002 law, which punishes those who operate a vehicle
without lawful presence in the United States w i th up to one year of hard
11
l abor and a fine of up to $ 1 000. 2 The enforcement pattern that emerges is
interesting. First, in 2003, 2004, and 2005 there was only one prosecution
under the driving while undocumented law. 1 1 3 In fact, prosecution under
11
the law did not begin in earnest until 2006. 4 The initial cases b rought
1 15
under the law mostly resulted in sentences of p robation and a fine.
Later,
1 16

after one Louisiana appe llate court found that the law was not preempted,
1 17
we started to see a movement towards prison sentences.
In 2009, there
were nineteen people sentenced to prison, and only seven sentenced to
1 18
under the Louisiana driving while undocumented law.

p robatio n

109. Korcmatsu

v.

1 1 0. l l irabayashi

United States, 584 F. Supp. 1 406 ( 1 984).

v.

United States, 828 F.2d 59 1 ( 1 987).

1 1 1 . LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1 4 : 1 00. 1 3 (20 1 0).

1 1 2. Enforcement Data, Louisiana Laws with respect to Nonresident Aliens or Alien Students
Statistical Analysis Center, Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement (July, I 20 1 0) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Louisiana Enforcement Data].
1 1 3. /d.
1 14. Id.

1 1 5. Id.
v.

1 1 6. State

v.

Lopez, 05-0685 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1 2/20/06); 948 So. 2d 1 1 2 1 , 1 1 25. But see State

Gonzalez-Perez, 07- 1 8 1 3 (La. App. I Cir. 2/27/08); 997 So. 2d I , 7-8, rehearing denied 09-

0292 (La. 1 211 8/09); 2 3 So. 3d 930 (concluding that law was not preempted by federal law).
1 1 7. Louisiana Enforcement Data, supra note 1 1 2 .

1 1 8. Id.
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U nderstanding these shifts in sentencing outcomes for state immigration
crimes is something that I think is important for future research.
PROFESSOR

ANDREA

ARMSTRONG

[MODERATOR ! :

Excellent.

Well, maybe I could just inject another question for the panel to consider,
which is the question of due process rights. W e ' ve talked today, both in the
earlier panel and now, about equal protection analysis as well as about
preemption, but I haven't heard any discussion yet about due process.

I

wonder if any of the panelists have some thoughts about what due process
adds to this debate.
might have some
PROFESSOR RAYMOND T. DIAM OND: Well, I
respect, I share a
thoughts about that. I ' m of a radical set, and in that
I believe that the
particular piece of radical ism with Justice Thoma s.
is under
Privileges and Immun ities Clause of the Fourtee nth Amendment
clause
This
recognized, indeed, nearly unrecognized i n our jurisprudence.

What
was the subject of great disservice in the Slaughterhouse Cases . 1 1 9
this
those of us who have read the Slaughterhouse Cases know is that
constitutes the first and only time when a clause of the United States
C onstitution has been interpreted to mean, for all practical purposes,
.
120
noth mg.
It does strike me, as it struck Justice Thomas in McDonald v. City of
121
the rights that Supreme Court jurisprudence p rotect s as
Chicago,
incorporated and thus protected against state intrusion under the

1 4th

Amendment' s Due Process Clause might more logically be protected under
1 22
the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
In McDonald, decided this last
summer on the question of whether the S econd Amendment right to keep
and bear arms is a right that extends against state encroachment the majority

1 1 9 . The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S . 36 (1872).

1 20. Id. Justice Field, dissenting in the Slaughterhouse Cases, was first to recognize th is point:

[U�der th� _majority opinion, t]hc amendment docs not attempt to confer any new privileges
·
or 1mmumhcs upon
. It assumes that
.
' or to cnumcrat c or dcfime those already existing
·
. citizens
there are such pnv1leges and immum't'1cs w h'1c h belong of right
·
· ·
as such and
to c1t1zcns
· ·
ordams
. that they shall not .be abridgcd b Y S late 1 cg1slat1on
· ·mh1b111on
. l f th1s
·
·
·
has no reference
.
.
.
to P rivilcge� and. 1�muml!cs of this character, but only refers, as held by the maJ'ori ty of the
u
h
co rt m t cir opm on to such pnvi· 1 egcs and 1mmumt1cs
·
· ·
as were before its adoption specially
1
·
·
dcs1gna
tcd m
. the Constitur
· d as belonging
�r neccssan· 1 Y tmphc
to citizens of the United
States it wasex� v�m an
idle enactment, w hich accomplished nothing, and most
�
u
nnec ssarily
t
C�ngress and the people on its passage . With privileges and
1
immunities thus de sign�
� t� or impltc� no State could ever have interfered by its laws, and no
new constitutional provision was rcqmrcd to inhibit
such interference .
Id. at 96; see also CHARLES L BLAC K, J R., A
NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM· HUMAN RIGHTS
' NAMED
1
.
.
. .
.
AND UNNAMED 56-69 ( 1 997) "I th e ou t ,
s
had no
e
'
nities
he
lause
c
.
r
' pnv1l eges or immu
vi w , t
.
·
operational meamng
.,, ( emph as1s m ongmal) Id. at 66.
.
121. McDonald v. City of Chicago 130 S
Ct. 3020, 3059 (20 1 0) ( Thomas, J . , concurring) .
1 22. id.
•

.

'

1�"

.

·

·

·

.

�

�

,

·
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of the court confirmed that it is a right, but only four of the members opined
that this is a right to be subjected to Due Process analysis, involving the
question of whether the right is fundamental and thus protected . 1 23

Justice

Thomas, who would discard the protection of n on-procedural rights under
the Due process Clause, 1 2 4 wrote that we ought to consider the right under

the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 125

My position is that the right to cross state lines is protected as a
1 6
fundamental right, 2 and while unlike Justice Thomas I have no hesitation

in accepting the right's protection under the Due Process C lause, I would

maintain that it ought to be protected under the Privileges and Immunities

clause as well. But Justice Thomas stands alone in his position and it seems

there is no majority of the Supreme C ourt willing to accept such an

argument. And so, I think we have to look at that right as a function of the

sort of liberty, and I think a fundamental liberty of citizens, indeed, of

persons under the Fourteenth Amendment, to cross state lines . 1 27

On that basis, if it is a fundamental right o f citizens, indeed, persons to

travel across state lines and to negotiate our way from a foreign country into

the United States, subj ect to regulation by the federal government, there arc

arguments to be made that states who interfere in the federal scheme of

regulation are interfering with a liberty protected under the Due Process
Clause irrespective of equal protection concerns.

PROFESSOR INGRID EAGLY: I agree with Professor Armstrong that

equal protection and due process are important to these debates, yet they

1 23. Id. at

3026.

1 24. In the view of Justice Thomas, the Due Process Clause "speaks only to 'process,"' and not
to substantive ri ghts .

Id.

at

3059.

1 25. Id. at 3059,

306 1 -62.
See Saenz v. Roe, 526

U . S . 489 ( 1 999).
Despite fundamentally differing views concerning the coverage of the Pri vi leges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, most notably expressed in the majority
and dissenting opinions in the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 ( 1 872), it has always
been common ground that this Clause protects the third component of the right to travel.
Writing for the majority in the Slaughter-House Cases, Justice Miller ex pl ained that one of

1 26.

the privileges conferred by this Clause "is that a c i ti zen of the United States can, o f his own
volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bona fide res idence therein, with the
same rights as other c itizens of that State. Id. at 80. Justice Bradley, in dissent, used even
stronger language to make the same point: "The states have not now. if they ever had, any
as
power to restrict their citizenship to any classes or pe rson s . A citizen of th e United States h.
a perfect constitutiona l right to go to and reside i n any State he chooses, and to claim
powe � of
citizenship therein, and an equality of rights with every other citizen; and the whole
the nation is pledged to sustain him in that ri ght . He is not bound to crin.gc to any superior,
by
or to pray for any act of grace , as a means of enjoying all the rights and privileges enjoyed
"

other citizens." Id. at 1 1 2- 1 1 3 .

Id. at 503-04.

1 27. See id.
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tend to be omitted from the dominant discourse. Consider the example of
Arizona. The federal govemm ent ' s chal lcn
_
.
first by the United States D1stnct Court.

9f to the Arizona
x

�

law was hea d

The federal govern

� ent s

challenge is based almost exclusively on a claim of federal preemption of
state law in the area of immigration and docs not incorporate equal
1 29
I think it is important to recognize,

protection or due process claims.

however, that other challenges to the l aw have inc luded such claims.

For

example, a suit brought by a coalition o f civil rights groups-including
MALDEF,

APALC,

the ACLU,

and

the

National

Imm igration

Law

Center-alleges that the law violates equal protection because it was
enacted with the intent to discriminate on the basis of race and national
130
In addition, the same suit a lleges that portions of the law violate

origin.

the Fourteenth Amendment' s guarantee o f due process by allowing law
enforcement to, among other things, detain persons in order to determine
131
The district court j udge in the case, Friendly
their immigration status.

House

v.

Whiting, recently found that the plaintiffs ' equal protection and

due process claims were sufficient to survive the Governor's motion to
132
As these c laims are further developed in the courts, I expect that
dismiss.
concerns about racial profiling and due process will also draw more
attention in the public debate.

PROFESSOR

RAYMOND T. DIAMOND:

comments bring something else to mind.

It strikes

me that your

I am a legal historian by trade or

perhaps by practice, and your remarks remind me of Plessy v. Ferguson, an
1 33
1 896 case which gave us "separate but equ a l . "
Plessy was an octoroon,
not distinguishable from most of the peopl e in this room and he argued in
ex rel. Plessy, the case before the Lou i s i ana Supreme Court that was
appealed to the U. S . Supreme Court, that judgments had been made about
.
.
h is rac1al status on the basis of his appearance. 134 The court noted the
possib ility that the people running the railroad might make a mistake in
1 35
making a racial identification.
This is the same kind of mistake of raci al
id ntifications that may well occur i n o n the spot enforceme nt of the
Anzona statute. Ex rel. Plessy suggeste d that if such mistakes are made,

�

1 28. See United States

v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980
(D. Ariz. 20 1 0 ) .
.
1 29. Complaint, United States v. Arizona, 703
F. Supp. 2d. 980 (D.
2: I OCVO I 4 1 3), 20 1 0 WL 265336 3.

1 30. Complaint at 56,

I 3 1.

Id �

1 88 .

ii

1 87, Friendly House

v.

Ariz. 20 1 0) (No.

Whitin g, No. CV J 0- 1 06 1 -SRB (D . Ariz. 20 I 0).

I 32. See Order on Motion to Dismiss,
·
FnendiY House v. Whrtmg, No. CV 1 0- 1 06 1 -PH X-SRB ( D.
.
Anz'. O t. , 2 I ) , t p //w
� S O O h t : ww. nilc.org/immlawpolicy/LocalLaw/Friendly-House-Order-on-Motion
to- Drsmrss. pdf.
·

·

1 33. �Jessy v. Fergu son, 1 63 U.S.
537, 550.5 2 ( 1 896) .
1 34. Ex parte Pless y, 45 La. Ann
. 80, 83 ( 1 89 3 ) .
1 3 5. Id.

·
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that the object of the mistake would have a an action in tort.

This could

lead to a very fine discussion in the Arizona context of Cheryl H arris'
1 36
seminal article, "Whiteness as Property," but time counsels against that.
PROFESSOR

HIROKO

KUSUDA:

My

thoughts

on

this

is

that

immigration judges refuse to entertain any constitutional arguments that we
make before them, however, we make such arguments everyday.

For

example, we always argue that aliens arc entitled to due process rights
under the Constitution.

Hopefully some day , when the cases go up o n the

appellate level, somebody will listen to us; yes, the U.S. Constitution should
be rigorously enforced in the administrative immigration proceedings.
I just wanted to share personal experience with a Japanese internment
case.

Fifteen years ago, I was a very new lawyer, wasn 't practicing law

very much because I was pregnant with my first child, and this old
gentleman came to me and said, "Hiroko, I know you are not busy.
you take a look at this document?"

Can

It was i n a huge envelope containing

these very brownish, old documents but I agreed because I did have a
lenty of time to read.
As I was reading the documents, I came to find out he was a U.S.
;itizen born in Pala Alto, California, in 1 9 1 8 , and he went back to Japan,
grew up there, but he came back as a young man to be an agricultural
worker in California.

And he enlisted in the Army, and there became a

decorated Army soldier. He was fast, he was very good, and he was given
many awards, and then Pearl Harbor h appened.

And he was discharged

without any reason whatsoever, with a bus fare, and went back to h i s home
where he had no job. Then, the Executive order of 9066 was i ssued by
1 37
Presid ent Roosevelt;
he had to leave Cal i fornia. He could compl y with
the two contradictory orders, apparently.
One was that you are not
supposed to leave your house because of the curfew, and i f you were to
leave you had to report to a location from which he would be sent to a
concentration camp. S o he decided to skip town, he left.
Years went by. He came to New Orleans and really worked hard and
became a very well-respected person i n the community . H e became a
supporter of many, many people of Japanese ancestry in the New Orleans

area. And he became an old rich man; I did not think he did not have a care
in the world. S o I was surprised when h e told me and said, "I j ust wanted to
get my honor back. Can you help me?" I realized that he lost the claim
filed under the Civil Liberties Act at the administrative level because he

1 36.

See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 1 06 HARV. L. REV. 1 709 ( 1 993) (discussing

legal implic ations of racial perceptions).
1 37. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 1 9, 1 942).
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was not interned, he was not qualified.
worry about it, j ust go away."

[Vol. 1 2

They basically told him "Don't

So I did the research and realized that we would have to file a lawsuit
against the U . S . government to pursue h i s c laim further, so we did just that,
and eventually the case was settled, and h e received the settlement, over
fifty years after he was expelled from h i s home town. I talked to him this
morning to get a permission to tal k about his case specifically. He was
really humbled by my offer. He i s ninety-two now, and "Waiting for the
God to call me," he said.
In the U . S . Supreme Court decision in Korematsu the Justices
basically upheld the constitutionality of the President's Executive Order,
s tat ing t hat :
Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of
h os ti l i ty to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war
with the Japanese Em pi re , because the properly constituted military
authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to
take proper security measures, because they decided that military
urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese
ancestry be segregated from the West Coast temporarily, and finally,
because Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of war in our
m ili tary leaders-as inevitabl 6 it must--deterrnined that they should
have t he power to do just this. 3 8
In fact, this order's constitutional ity was affirmed based upon one
1
person ' s st at ement, General DeW i tt . 3 9
H e was a general of the War
Depa rtment at the time, and he basical l y said there is evidence of espionage
140
by Japanese ci tizens, and people o f Japanese descent.
Some people
argued that this law only applies to noncitizens in the United States.
A merican peop l e were wronged by the Japanese people who had no legal
paper who can ' t complain about this treatment. The history shows that that
was not tme. It makes me sad that an argument similar to thi s i s circulating
around this country . General DeWitt testified in San Francisco before the
board, he said, "I don 't want any o f them here," meaning persons of
141
Japanese anccstry.
He continued to say,
They are
UX

a

dangerous

element.

There is no way to determine their

Korcmatsu v. United States. 323 U.S. 2 1 4, 223
( 1 944) .

l .N. Id

�It
see also Lt. Gen. John L. De Wilt'.\·
Final Report; Japanese Evacuation.from the West
( .ll<L\I NL. 1 1 11: VIRTUA L MUSEU M OF
Tl lE CITY OF SAN FRANCI SCO, http://www.sfinuseum.org/
war1dcw1ttO.hhnl ( l ast visited Mar. I . 20

�n:

1 40. >.: 11r<"111a1.,·11 l23 U . S . at 227.

1 4 1 . Id

at

2J6.

•

•

1 1 ).
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loyalty. The west coast contains too many vital installations essential
to the defense of the country to allow any Japanese people on this
coast . . . .

The danger of the Japanese was, and is now-if they are

permitted to come back-espionage and sabotage.

It makes no

difference whether he is an American citizen, he is still a Japanese.
American citizenship does not necessarily determine loyalty . . . . But
we must worry about the Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the
map.

Sabotage and espionage will make problems as long as he is
.
142
' area . . . .
m th is

aIIowed

He made this allegation without a shred of credible evidence.
sentiment

that

emanates

from

this

statement

eerily

mirrors

So the
what's

happening in this c ountry, in certain parts of the country, and I hope we
don't repeat the same mistake ever again.

PROFESSOR ANDREA ARMSTRONG (MODERATOR] : We have time to
reflect together as a group, so if there are any questions that have been
percolating in your mind, now would be the time to come to one of the
microphones or raise your hand.

QUESTION FROM PROFESSOR JENNIFER CHACON: I have one, and it
goes to Professor Kusuda and Professor Eagly, I think.

This is about the

driving while undocumented law, and specifically the statistics that you arc
looking at that show an increased rate o f arrests post-2006, and it made me
think of a recent study by the Warren Institute, and they 've done a couple
now, looking at j urisdictions where 2 87(g) has gone into effect, noting the
changes in the arrest profile that occurred.

There seemed to be a spike in

the arrests of Latinos.

And sometimes you see more aggressive police
1 43
enforcement after 287(g) programs have been implemented.
And the
lead charge in those cases tends to be minor offenses, such as document
related offenses. In Florida they looked at driving without a license, which
obviously is something you can't really ascertain by seeing the person, so
that may suggest that something else was motivating stops in these cases.
And it made me wonder whether the increase that we 're seeing in the
arrests and prosecutions of the driving while undocumented relate in any
way to any

287(g)

collaborations

or

w h ether

there ' s

any

kind

of

state/federal col laboration in enforcement e fforts and the use of certain state
laws in prosecutions.

142. Id.
Criminal
!43. Trevor Gardner I I & Aarti Kohli, The C.A.P. Effect: Racial Profiling in the ICE
du/filcs/
rkclcy.e
http://www.law.bc
(2009),
INSTITUTE
Alien Program,
WARREN
THE
996), 8
1
(
287(g)
§
Act
po!icybrief_irving_F INAL.p df; see also Immigration and N ationality

U.S.C. § I 357(g) (2006).
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that we currently
of the l imit atio ns of the data
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very fine-grain ed: i t tracked defe ndan
le d
H o wever, these sort o f detai
al.
46
of prosecutio n and eventual remov
1
.
v a l arc rare and hard to o b tam.
records from the point of arrest to remo

��}

�

received from the State of
g while undoc umen ted law,
Louisiana regard ing enforcement of the drivin
Analy sis Center for the
the data were much more l imited. As the Statist ical
ed its respon se, "[t]he
Louisiana Comm i s sion on Law Enforc ement explain
unable to compare
following are not exhaustive numbers s i nc e we were
were impose d but not a
these figures with deportations by INS or fines that
7
4
1
Thus, the records that I
part of the Department of Corrections records ."
of
referenced earlier are limited to what is c ontained in the Department
people
many
how
Corrections database. Therefore, the data docs not re flect
For example,

I

that

in the response

are being arrested and charged under the l aw w ithout making their way into
Department of Corrections records.

PROFESSOR HIROKO KUSUDA :
2 87(g) programming

in

this

area,

Fortunately, we

don ' t

do

have

we

however,

have any
a

Secure

Communities program fully implemented in several pari shes, which is more
troublesome, because under 28 7(g), the federal government .. trains" local
14x
enforcement officials which implicates a l l kinds of complications.
In
Secure C�rnmunity, nobody has to l i ft a fi nger, as it is simply an automatic
.
transm1ss1on of the
fingerprint
information and sharing
criminal
149
background data between the federal government with state j u risdictions.
It is very difficult for us to track how they implement the system and
.
the mergmg between state and federal c riminal justice systems.
ICE
1 44. Gardner & Kohli, supra note 1 43
.

145. See generally Andrea Guttin' The Cnmma
· · / A t1en
·
prugram: lmm1gratwn
Enjurceme11t in
·
·
.
Tirav1s County, Texas, IMMIGRATION POLICY CT . (F eb
2 0 l 0), http://www. 1mm1grat1onpohcy.orgt
.
. rat1on-en
special-reports/cnmina
· ·
1 -ar1en-program-1mm1g
forcement-travis·co unty-texa s
1 46. Gardner & Kohli supra note 1 43 ' at 3 -4 ( explaining
that the arrest records obtained for the
,
study were "uni· que,, and "extremely rare").
14 7. Louisiana Enforc ement Data, supra note 1
1 2.
·

-

�

·

·

·

·

·

·

.

·

·

1 48. Memorandum of Agreement Between U
.
S D<;partm<::
,
,nt of Homeland Securm· /mm1gratwn
· ·
and Customs E11.J
,.r,
orcement and Lou/Siana
·
·
sfate po 1tee,
.
LOUISIA NA STATE POLICE ( Dec. 1 2. 2009) .
.
.
http-//
. www.1ce.govIdoc11 / 01a/secure_commun
.
ities-moa/r_l ouisiana 1 1 -30-09 . df.
P
1 49. Secure Comm unities .· A p-,act
Sheet, I M M IG RATION PC)(.ICY CTR .. (Nov. 4. 2 0 1 0) .
.
.
.
.
.
http-//
. www.1mm1grat1on pol1cy .org/Ju st-fact
s/secu re-com munit ies-fact-shect.
.

.

·

·

��

-

.

20 1 1 ]

Panel on Federalism i n Practice

403

apparently favors this program, because they intend to complete national
wide implementation of this program by

20 1 3 .

And I understand that in

terms of the tracking data, I can only give you anecdotal information that I
obtained from the

local

criminal

defense

bar.

According

to

them

prosecution under the Louisiana Statute is basically concentrating in the
Southeast, southeastern

part of the

state,

b ecause that's

where

the

concentration of Latin populations are, New Orleans specifically. There arc
many prosecutions to this day, especially the j urisdiction that upheld the
1 50
I haven't
constitutionality of the "Driving While Undocumented" statute.
gotten the final number yet, but so far the Louisiana Supreme Court has not
shown any intent to deal with this situation.
So, yes, the local enforcement is actually happening now because of
151
where Professor McKanders

the 287(g) programs, like in Tennessee,

practices, which is the most troublesome and prevalent.

But as far as

Louisiana is concerned, we do have more problems, as there is no one
person to blame for racial profiling because the machine is doing its own
work. Can machines racially profile people? That's another issue that we
will have to litigate another day.
QUESTION FROM

PROFESSOR KARLA

MCKANDERS:

I

have

a

question for Professor D iamond. I have been doing research on the 1 850
1 52
Fugitive Slave Act,
and the administrative body that it created, that issued
certificates of re moval to send slaves back to the slaveholding state and the

slave owner.

And I was wondering, have you done any research in this

area?
And then my second question i s some immigration scholars have
indi cated that c o mparing the early system migration of African slaves to
America is not a valid, shouldn't be included in an immigration system
because Africans were considered property, and I was wondering what your
thoughts are on using that justification to exclude the migration of African
Americans in the United States from our conception of immigration law?
PROFESSOR RAYMOND T. DIAMOND: As to the first question, I ' ve
not rese arched this recently, but as to the second, I disagree. I think the

1 808 Clause, as does the rest of the Constitutio n, recognizes implicitly
though not explicitly that Africans brought to the country as slaves were

1 50. State v. Gonzalez-Perez, 07-1 8 1 3 (La. App. I Cir. 2/27/08); 997 So. 2d I , 7-8, rehearing
denied 09-0292 (La. 1 2/ 1 8/09); 23 So. 3d 930.
009),
1 5,
1 5 1 . Memorandum of Agreement, TENNESSEE HIGHWAY PATROL (Oct.
http ://www.ice.gov/docJ ib/foia/memorandumsofAgreementU nderstanding/r 287gten nesseehtghw

�

_

aypatrol l O l 509.p df.
1 52. Fugitive Slave Act, 9 Stat. 463 ( 1 850).
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property. While implicitly the Constitution addresses Afri � ans brought into
the country and Africans in the country as s lave � or free, it addresses them
1 53
_
explicitly only as "persons."
A very inter�s mg conflict was presented
between two different sets of anti-slavery activists. Some argued that the

�

315 Clause, the 1 808 Clause, and the Fugitive Slave Clause were clearly

1 5 3. The Constitution does not explicitly mention slavery and race and deals squarely with the
issue of slavery in only three places. Article 1, Section 2, C lause 3, the "3/5 Clause." apportioned
direct or capitation taxes and membership in the House of Representatives in accordance with
population, but counted a slave as only three-fifths of a person. Article I. Section 9, Clause 1 . the

1 808 Clause, forbade Congress to limit the importation of s l aves until 1 808, a period of twenty
Article IV, Section 2, Clause 3, the Fugitive Slave C lause, provided that fugitive slaves

years.

who escaped into another state would be returned to their owners. Yet, the wording in each
instance is delicate. The 3/5 Clause provides:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may
be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be
detennined by adding to the whole N umb er of free Persons, including those bound to Service
for a Term of Ycars, and exc l uding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all ot her Persons.

U.S. CONST. art. 1,

§ 2, cl. 3. The 1 808 Clause provided:

The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existi ng shall think
proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight
hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten
dollars for each Person.

U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 9, cl.

l.

And the Fugitive Slave Clause, in language that could be applied to

indentured servants as well as escaped slaves, provided:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into
another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation th erein , be discharged from such
Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of t he Party to whom such Service or
Labour may be due.

U . S . CONST. art. IV,

§ 2, cl. 3. Antislavery activists would argue that these indirect references to

slaves meant that the Constitution was an antislavery document.

See, e.g. , 2 THE FREDERICK

226-27 (John W . Blassingame ed. 1 979) (remarks of Samuel R. Ward, Jan.
1 7, 1 850) [hereinafter DOUGLASS PAPERS) ; see also 3 id. at 385-86 (Douglass' address entitled

DOUGLASS PAPERS

What to the Slave is the Fourth ofJuly? (July 5, 1 852)); 3 id. at 1 5 1 -62 (remarks during a debate

on whether the Constitution i s antislavery in intent (May 20-2 1 , 1 857)); id. at 1 63 , 1 8 1 -83

(address on the Dred Scott decision (May 1 4, 1 857)); ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR ,
FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 73- 1 02 ( 1 970).
Antislavery forces were far from unanimous on this position. See, e.g., WILLIAM PHILLIP, THE
CONSTITUTION A PRO-SLAVERY COMPACT ( 1 856); see a/so W I LLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES
OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIO NALISM IN AMERICA,
Even
at 229-48 ( 1 977).

1 760- 1 848,

Douglass at one time had argued that the effect of the Constitution and the
intent of its framers
was t be a proslavery document. See 2 DOUGLASS
PAPERS, supra, at 23 1 -3 2 (remarks of
�
Frederick Douglass (Jan. 1 7, 1 850)).
Debat on the pro-slavery effect and intent behind
the Constitution is a matter as well of more
�
recent vmtage
Just'1c e Thurgood MarshaJI argued the pro-slavery underpinnings of the
.
Const1 tut1on m The cons 1
.
uu 1wn ,s B zcentenma
. /: Commemorating the Wrong Document? 40
VAND. L. REV. 1 337 ( 1 98 7)
.
. . .
.
.
e
was
su
H
'
�ected
b
to great cnt1c1sm for his pos1t1on
See' e.g. '
. .
.
.
W 1 1 1 iam Bradford R eyno
Ids, A nother View: Our Magnificen t Constitution, 40 V AND. L. REV.
.
1 3 43 ( 1 987) [heremaft
.
er Reyn 0Ids, Another v·1ew] ; see also Wil
liam Bradford Reynolds Securing
.
l ''berty m an Egalitarian
Age 5 2 M o L · RE . 5 8 5 ( 1 987) [hereinafter Reynolds, Securing
,
l iberty] .
But see . M . hael Middleto
.
n, Securing Justice: A Response to William Bradfor
d
Reynolds 52 Mo L
EV . 607 < 1 987); Raymond T. Diamon
·
d, No Call to Glorv: Thurgood
.
Marshall;s Thesis
on th e Intent ofa Pro-Slavery
Constitution, 42 V AND. L. REV. 93 ( 989).
.

.

·

·

·

�

·

•

�

·

l
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pro-slavery, rendering the Constitution a pro-slavery document. 1 54

Others

argued that the avoidance of the term "slave" or "slavel " evinced an
(s
implicit purpose not to give constitutional warrant to slavery. 55
The language

of the

1 808 Clause

is

that "[t]he

Migration

or

Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think

proper to admit, shall not be prohibited b y the Congress prior to the Year
one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may b e imposed on

such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person." 1 56 Whi l e the

expression "[i]mportation of such Persons as any of the States now existing

shall think proper to admit" suggests

that

Africans were

obj ects of

commerce, the language "[ m]igration . . . o f such Persons as any o f the

States now existing shall think proper to admit" speaks to a recognition that
enslaved Africans were in fact people.

There is a case, the first of the Negro seamen cases, in which Justice

Johnson sitting as a circuit justice in 1 823, ruled on a South Carolina statute

which forbade Negro sailors from disembarking at port. 157 Justice Johnson

recognized that it was Congress' power under the Commerce C l ause that

would allow for it to regulate the passage o f persons into the country. 1 58 He

wrote of free persons, and yet it was the same Commerce Clause which
woul d allow for Congress to regulate trade in persons into the country. 1 59
Congress's commercial regulatory authority extended to trade in persons

who were property, thus allowing Congress to regulate the African s lave

trade, but Congress ' s power to "establish an uniform Rule of
Natura lization"1 60 necessarily involves either as a matter of implied power

or necessary and proper power, the power to regulate immigration as well,

the power to admit or deny entry to aliens who would be subjects of a rule

of naturalization. Hence, I disagree with the critics. The Commerce C lause

certainly allows for Congress to regulate the African slave trade, and that
point standing alone would support those who disagree with me.

But I

would suggest that congressional power, pretermitted by the 1 808 Clause,

to regulate the migration or importation o f a single class of individuals
"such Persons as any of the States now e x isting shall think proper to
admit," not persons in the first instance and property in the second--carries

with it, either as a matter of implied power or necessary and proper power,

1 54. Marshall, supra note 153 ; Middleton, supra note 153; and Diamond, supra note 153.
1 55. Reynolds, Another View, supra note 153; Reynolds, Securing Liberty, supra note 1 53.
1 56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
I 57. Elikson

v.

Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493, 493 (C.C.S.C. I 823) (No. 4,366).

1 58. Id. at 495.
1 59.

Id.

1 60. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 4.
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.
ell .
the power to reguI ate immigrat ion as w
·

·

Again, I disag ree with the

critics.
R I : Thank you .
PROFE SSOR ANDREA ARMSTRONG [MOD ERATO
QUESTION FROM PROFESSOR BILL ONG HING: I would like to ask a

question about litigation strategies, and I hope it' s n�t going to be too far
_
.
afield; if it is, you don' t have to answer it, but I thmk it connects to some of
the

points that were made earlier on.

I was flipping through the CLE

materials that were handed out earlier today, and I was shocked when I
came across, and maybe I shouldn't be shocked, but I was nonetheless, at
an amicus brief that is contained within these materials in the Arizona,
Legal Arizona Workers Act case in the Supreme Court, the amicus brief as
put in by the Chamber o f Commerce, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, that
it, is the same U . S . Chamber of Commerce that has been instrumental in
funneling money from known and unknown sources to candidates who are
incredibly hostile to the rights of undocumented migrants and others.

161

So to be taking a position i n litigation that a state law that penalizes
undocumented migrants, albeit by imposing sanctions against employers
who hire them, seems to some degree surprising. So to what extent is there
maybe a hopeful, and I realize that it's not e ntirely hopeful, to what degree
is there a strategy in litigation through this kind of almost an idea of a
citizen proxy, where you have literally an organization that represents U.S.
citizens and companies which, in light of recent Supreme Court decisions,
stand on equal footin g with those citizens for purposes of donating money
to candidates. Does this in some way kind of break up or shake up how we
think about litigation which so far today has been presented mainly through
the model of preemption?
PROFESSOR HIROKO KUSUDA: It is important to work with non

traditional

For

partners.

example,

American

Immigration

Lawyers

Association and U.S. Chamber of Commerce oftentimes form an alliance
commonly

referred

to

as

" strange

bedfellows."

Putting

aside

the

differences, there i s a case that they have teamed up in the past in getting a
number of worker visas increased.

n; 2

I am concerned there is also

a

direct relationship between the

�orporate profit and immigrant detention. For example, a corporation may
introduce a bill written by their lobbyists, such as the case with the
Correction Corporation of America, a for-profit company that earns profit

1 6 1 . Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae

Supporting Petitioners

Commerce of U.S. v. W hiting, 1 30 S. Ct. 534 (20 1 0) (No. 90-1 1 5), 20 1 0 WL 350 1

Chamber of

l80.

1 62 . Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Chertoff, 8 : 08-cv-03444-AW (D. Md. S . D. 2008).
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from incarcerating nonci tizens, which has been reported to be actively
involved in drafting state legislation that favors their position.

In terms of

forming a litigation strategy, we do pick our partners, well, as long as our
interests overlap.

We also work with various religious groups.

The

Catholic Church takes a very strong position on migration and admission of
immigrants in this country. On certain issues we disagree; however, there
has been a very strong working relationship between us and them. W e also
work with the Lutheran Church.
QUESTION FROM PROFESSOR BILL ONG HING: Thank you.

yOU

know, well also, the Chief of Staff, actually is on the B oard o f the
Department of Corrections.

But, you know i f you look at the litigants in

some of the cases mentioned, some of the plaintiffs actually were business
owners, they were landlords, and they were a restaurant owner, and others.
They used that litigation strategy as well, and that puts, that played a critical
role. And I think you are right, that it's a strategy that is important.
AUDIENCE QUESTION : I'm wondering, to what extent we ought to

take some lessons from what happened a couple of days ago in Iowa, where
three of the state Supreme Court justices who were on the court when it
held; I'm not really familiar with who or what the law was, but basically it
held that same-sex marriage was constitutional. 163 And then, these three
justic es were voted out o f office in an election, where typically they had
been re-e lected. 1 64
I am wondering whether we should take any lessons from that in this
context because here we are dealing with folks who are: A) noncitizens,
who are, in this political climate, not very popular, and that ' s not a unique
event as we all know. But B), you compound that with the fact that they
have some involvement with the criminal justice system. So you have two
groups of people, or two interactions, two statuses which make a person not
popu lar, and you provide them i n one individual, and that makes them

really not popular. And, so I ' m wondering to what extent we should take
lesso ns from what happened in Iowa, given that most state court judges are
elected, just like they are in Iowa.
PROFESSOR

RAYMOND

T.

DIAMOND:

Your question

puts

the

Which is it, what i s the deci� ion making b? dy
�
.
which ought to be making these decisions about nrum gration, � bort1on,
following question to me.

racial or gender or sexual preference discrimination, or anything else
controversial?

163. Varnum
164. See

I do not speak to these other matters, though I do note a

763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
,
Chris Geidner, Jn Iowa, Judges Are Ousted
v.

Brien,

M ETRO WEEKL Y (Nov.

AM), http://www.metroweekly. com/poliglot/20 I 01 I I /in-iowa-judges-are. html.

3, 20 1 0. 1 : 1 6

[Vol. 1 2

Loyola Journal of Public Interest Law

408

substantial history o f courts undertaking decision-making on then:i , but I
_
_
think that there is an argument that these issues of 1mm1gratton arc
inherently political, and that the Constitution recognizes that it's Congress'
power to make these decisions.
I have argued today that it is not constitutional for the st� te to make
_
certain sorts of decisions about immigration, as has been done m Arizona.
As a political matter, it may be the better course of action for C ongress to
act, to undertake actively to refuse that which Arizona and other states arc
doing now--or to make a decision, a p o l itical decision, to confirm the
judgment of the states, even if not their particular legislation.
One wonders if we would be in a better place if we have an active
national discussion, about what our immigration policy ought to be, instead
o f having discussions i n our courts about the limits of immigration policy,
in a way which potentially exposes the judiciary to the criticism that is
displacing the political will of the states on a matter inherently political.
Moreover, many of the critics will fail-whether deliberately obtuse or
not-to recognize that there are legal and not simply policy issues that are
likely

to

control

results

in

legal

challenges

to

state

immigration

enforcement.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: I have one question.

Ok, you talk about

immigration and illegal immigrants. And I guess my question is, where we
do we stop?

Do we let everyone in from an impoverished nation; they

could just walk in, illegally, across our b orders?

I mean, I think that we

have a right to exist without having to be taxed to support people who
cannot afford it, that are not citizens.

And, I don't understand.

I do

understand, like with the Japanese, I thought what they' ve done [the United
States government] was terrible, and I d o understand some of the things,
there was a young man in the paper who had served in the military, was
honorably discharged, and now they want to send him back because he's an
illegal alien.
But at some point, the American people have to take a stand.
Ap �arently, Washington and our national government is not going to, so are

we JUSt hopeless and defenseless in our own country? We have to wait for

them to de �ide what they're going to d o about controlling i mm i gration, or
�houl we Just open our borders to every poor country? Africa, the people

�

m

Chma who are treated so terribly, India, y o u know any poor country or

country where the people are treated terribl y .

Do we just have to open our

borders to them and let them over here? When we are excluding scientists,
and doctors, and statesmen, and teachers and professors?
PROFESSOR ANDREA ARMSTRONG

[MODERATOR] :

Thank you.
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Professor Eagly, would you like to comment on some of the issues she
raises?

PROFESSOR INGRID EAGLY: I am happy to start a conversation

regarding your question.

We do

have

a

very large undocumented

population in the United States-over eleven m i llion undocumented people
6
are present in this country by recent estimates. 1 5
You highlight the

question of whether unauthorized migration should be addre ssed through

enforcement or rather through comprehensive immigration reform. I realize

that there is public sentiment, like the sentiment that you express, favoring
increased enforcement.

However, there is also strong public sentiment

favoring immigration reform.

AUDIENCE RESPONSE: It could be,

you know, overhauling the

immigration law, but I just think that we have to have, the people of the

United States who are c itizens here, have to fee l their citizenship counts for
somethi ng.
PROFESSOR INGRID EAGLY: I think you are raising issues that go to

the heart of these debates.

One of the things that we have to think about

when we are looking at enforcement at the local level is not just whether the

locality has the authority to enforce the law, but also whether we want a

unifonn immigration policy.

Overall, w e have a national immigration

pol icy that focuses very little on enforcement.

As the system has evolved,

we increasingly rely on the criminal justice system to funnel m igrants into
the deportation system. Within this civil-criminal enforcement system, if
localities function differently with respect to their prioritizations of certain

crimes, the immigration functioning at the local level can vary drastically
from region to region. For example, data released recently under the federal

Secure C ommunities program in response to a Freedom of Information Act
request, reveals how many people were removed as a result of certain
. .
66
cnm mal convictions at the county level. 1
From county to county there are
different prioritizations of removals. Some counties focus on those who are

conv icted of serious felonies, while others have higher rates o f removal of
those who have been convicted of only a petty crime, or have no criminal
record at all .167

1 65. MICHAEL HOEFER NANCY RYTINA & BRYAN C. BAKER, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
OFFICE OF IMMIGR. STAT. ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING
IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2008, 2-3 & fig. I (2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/

:

xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe 2008.pdf.
_

1 66. See U.S. I MMIGR. A N D CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SECURE COMMUN ITIES: NATIONWIDE
ial
INTEROPERABILITY BY CONVICTION REPORT (20 I 0), available at http://ww w.icc.gov/doclib/fo

secure_communities/nationwide_interoperability_conviction-july.pdf.
1 67.

Id.
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So, on a de

facto

level, we see the criminal system fostering very

different immigration policies at the local level. I will stop there to let the
other panelists respond to these questions.
PROFESSOR RAYMOND T. DIAMOND: Well, I think the question

really speaks a frustration which is shared by very, very many in the
country. But the problem is larger than simply illegal immigration. During
the days of the Prohibition, we couldn' t protect our border to the north from
168
importation of alcohol.
In today ' s world, we can't protect our borders
from cocaine coming into the country from South America, or from heroin
and other drugs coming in from Asia, or any drug coming in from
1 69
and many sense that we cannot protect our borders against entry
Mexico,
by persons unauthorized by immigration authorities. We try mightily, and
we do many effective things but many things we do are ineffective and
whether effective or not, whatever we do is e xpensive.

I think all of this

helps explain the sort of frustration expressed by the question.
Having said this, the question really is, what are our political decision
makers going to do with that frustration.

As citizens, we have the right to

ask them to do something about our frustration. The statute in Arizona, as
well as bills in Louisiana and elsewhere, along with the positions taken by
the nine states and eighty-eight members of Congress, in signing briefs in
170
support of the Arizona statute -al1 are indications that political decision
makers sense frustration. I think a very significant question is whether the
right political power center is acting.

That power center, given the

Supremacy Clause, does not reside anywhere in state government, but in
Congress. States don ' t make immigration law, and the federal c ourts don't
make immigration law either. So I will c onfirm what the questioner doesn't
need any confirmation of, that these are legitimate concerns.
PROFESSOR HIROKO KUSUDA: I wanted to share the most recent Pew

Centers

Hispanic

Apparently

a

report on documented

most

recent

report

undocumented people in this country.

171

immigrants

in

about

estimated

this

country.

1 1 .9

million

And apparently the population

1 68. DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIB
ITION 2 ) , ) 06-07 ( ) 979).
1 69. U . S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE NAT ' L DRUG I NTELLIG
ENCE CTR. No. 2 0 1 0-Q03 1 7-001 ,
NATIONA DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 20 I 0, http://w
ww.justice.gov/ndic/pu bs38/3 866 1 I.

_7

�

1 0. Bnef for States of Michigan, et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Defendants-A ppellants,
mted Stat s v.
rizona (20 1 0) (N · I 0- 1 6645), 2 0 1 0
WL 5 1 62508; Brief for Members of
_
ongress Bnan B ilbray, et al. as Am1c1. Cunae
Suppor ting Defendants-Appellant s, United States
v. Anzona (20 1 0) (No. 1 0- 1 6645), 20 1 0 WL
5 1 62 5 2 0 ; Brief of Intervenor-Ap pellant Arizona
State Senator Russell Pearce Supporting Defend
ants-A ppellants ' United States v. Arizon a (201 0)
(No. 1 0- 1 6645), 2 0 1 0 WL 5 1 625 1 6.

�

�

'.'

?

1 7 1 . Jeffrey Passel & D'Vera Cohn A p
ortra1t of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United
'
Sfates, PEW HISPA NIC CTR., i (Apr. 14, 2 0
1 O), http://pewhispanic.org/files/repo
rts/ I 0 7 _ pdf.
·

·
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However, the number apparently

has since stabilized, and in this new analysis the center estimates that the
172
It finds
rapid growth of unauthorized immigrant workers also has halted.
that there are 8.3 million undocumented immi grants in the U . S . labor force
in March of 2008 .

173

I agree with your position that we can't keep accepting people from all
over the world without proper rules and procedures in place. One of which
I think is very important, for the U .S . government to do, is that w e have to
demand accountability from employers.

According to the most recent

announcement from the Secretary of Department of Homeland Security,
"[s]ince January 2009,

ICE has audited more than 3200 employers
174
They audited "225 companies and

suspected of hiring illegal labor."

individuals, and imposed approximately $50 million in financial
175
sanctions."
This doubled the total amount of audits administered during
176
the entire previous administration.
That being said, there are still not enough employer sanctions.
personal experience
largest immifiration
1
Mississippi.
And
.
U . S. citizen
.
s, green

My

dealing with a worksite raid in 2008, which was the
raid in the history of the United States, occurred in
almost 600 arrests were made of a varietv of workers,

(18

The most
recent report noted that only one employee manager of the company that
179
hired over 3000 workers was charged and convicted.
So here is evidence
card holders, and undocumented people.

of the federal government not doing its job.

There is already a law on the

books, which was passed to punish U . S . employers who hire undocumented
workers, which has to be enforced.

And also, yes, we do have to worry

about people who are fleeing from persecution as we have an international
obligation to protect human rights.

Also as one of the most powerful

nations in the country, the United States should take a leadership role in
stabilizing a country that is going through civil turmoil.
Somalia where

there

is

For example,

no functioning government since

1 99 1 ,

and

1 72. Id.
1 73. Id.

1 74. Secretary Napolitano Announces Record-breaking Immigration Enforcement Statistics
Achieved under the Obama Administration, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY (Oct. 6, 201 0),
http://www .dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr 1 28638993 6778.shtm .
_

1 75. Id.
1 76. Id

(Aug. 26, 2008, 7: 1 1 PM),
1 77. Feds detain nearly 600 in Miss. plant raid, MSNBC.COM
rts/.
cou
_and_
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26 41 0407/ns/us_news-crime
1 78. Id.

Doesn 't Pay, FED'N FOR
Enforcement-Break.1�g the Law
_
/News2?page-NewsArt1cle&1dAM ERICAN IM MIGRATION REFORM, http://www .fairus.org/s1te
1 , 201 1 ).
l664 1 &security= l 6 0 l &news_iv_ctrl=l 007 (last visited Mar.
1 79. Interior
·

Jmmigratwn
·

.

.

.

_
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and socio-political issues that may be beyond our control, however, I do
share your concern that we can do better than we have been doing in
executing our obligations.
RESPONSE FROM PROFESSOR BILL ONG HING: I actually want to

disagree a little bit with the last two panelists' comments, a couple of
points, and respond to your concerns.
First of all, part of the reasoning that you gave for your frustration
over undocumented immigration that I think, Professor Diamond, you
implicitly agreed with, when you said that you understand the sheer
frustration and that there is a solid basis for that frustration. That ' s the part
I would ask us to be cautious about, because part of your frustration as I
understood it, one o f the phrases or sentences that you used was with
respect to the cost o f the immigrants, that we as citizens are bearing.
That's something we should be a little bit careful about because I've
read the economic reports, that's what I do every time there ' s a new
economic report done on the economic impact of immigrants, and they are
basically two-fold.

One is with respect to employment displacement, and

the other is with respect to costs, hard costs. And believe me, we didn't get
into it, taxwise, and employment creation-wise by the immigrants that are
here, especially when it comes to undocumenteds.

Undocumenteds put in

way more than you or I put in proportionally that is taken back out in terms
of our tax refunds, in terms of our services, and you only have to look at the
immigration policy center website and each individual state that they've
looked at with respect to both of those issues, you will find the states with
the most immigrants, every decade for the last I 00 years, have the lowest
1 80
unemployment rates.
The states with the least number of immigrants
181
have the highest unemployment rate.
The other thing that I would be a little bit cautious about i s stating
that, and I think you said that we' re
scientists.

"excluding" professionals and

I n fact, that's not true of the scientists and the people with

professional abilities.

Their visas are pretty plentiful.

It' s actually the

families, you know, family categories that have to wait many, many years,
okay

:

It's not the professionals you are alluding to. We can go look at the

website of the immigration numbers;
_
categones. Those folks get to come in.

there' s not a backlog in those

I 80. Rob Para] & Madura Wijewardena, The
Unemployment and Immigration Disconnect: Untying the
Knot Part I of III,. lMMIGRA�ON POLICY CTR.
3 (May 19, 2009), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/
spec1al-reports/untymg-knot-senes-unemployment-an
d-immigration.
1 8 1 . Id.
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And with enforcing employer sanctions, there ' s a real problem when

we are blaming the employers, okay?

I agree a hundred percent, and you

didn't say this, okay? That employers exploit the hell out of undocumented

workers, okay? Not all of them, but a lot of them do. And there are a lot of

ways of going after those employers that explo it undocumented workers,

without the use of employer sanctions.

There are health and safety laws,

there are minimum wage laws, and there arc other conditional laws. I offer

enforcing those, and the truth is, if you enforce those laws, you may in fact

make those jobs a little bit more appealing to lawful residents and citizens
of the United States.

So I'm all for that, let's go after the employers who exploit, but let's

go after them with labor laws and employment laws. Because the problem

with employer sanctions laws is that they buy into the notion that there's a

problem with undocumented migration, and I don't think there' s a problem
with undocumented immigration.

If you were here earlier, and li stened to a little bit of what I said, we

have to understand why people are here. And I think if we understood why

people are here, we ' d calm down, because a lot of what the reasons that

people are here, they ' re way beyond the control of their movement.

It's

more within our control as shareholders of corporations that our, that our
inve stment , our retirement funds are invested in.
We have got to be
complaini ng to these multinational corporations that our mutual funds are

invested in. That's where the power is.
undocumented.

We shouldn' t be blaming the

Nobody is asking the United States to take every poor person in the
world , but I will agree with one thing that' s implicit in what you are saying,
and that 's that I do not believe that more enforcement money or a very

generous amnesty w i l l solve the undocumented immigration problem. Let
me repe at that-the most generous legalization program and spending

billions more at the border, neither one of those is going to solve the
undocumented immi gration problem.
That problem is not going to be
solved until we work with those countries and get them to shape up with

the ir economy , and I ' m telling you, the United States has, is complic it in
that.

�

tates has
It doesn ' t take a brain surfeon to figure . out that the United
more to gain from NAFTA , 1 8 that the Umted States corporations have
more to gain from the WT0, 1 83 which is NAFTA on steroids . Let's not
blame the people who are really econo mic refugees. They' re not here
1 82. 1 9 U.S.C.S.
1 83.

§ 330 1 ( 1 993) (North American Free Trade Agreement).

World Trade Organization.
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because they would rather be here.

They would rather be home working.

There are three or four of us that have said that already.

It' s the truth.

�

Spend some time with them, interview them, and ask them, "w cre would
.
.
m Mexico if they had

you rather be?" They'd rather be living their dreams
the work.

They are here to feed their families, that's why no matter how

much money you put at the border, you can mine that goddamn border,
they're going to continue coming if we don't solve the real push factors that
are causing this .
PROFESSOR ANDREA ARMSTRONG [ MODERATOR] : What I ' d like to

do is, we have one additional contribution from Dean Demleitner, and then
I'd like to offer the panelists an opportunity for some closing thoughts,
briefly, because we are at the end of our time after this brief discussion.
DEAN NORA V. DEMLEITNER: I ' m guilty about taking our time,

especially speaking after Professor Hing, but I think there is one point that I
don't think has been covered by the media surprisingly enough, because I
do believe that there is at least one group that has a true stake in this
enforcement

policy.

A

financial

stake,

and

that's

the

Corrections

Corporation of America. If it is accurate, the latest media reiE orts that they
1
were actively involved in drafting the Arizona legislation. 4 And a few
years ago, they were telling their shareholders in public documents--<lon't
worry, even if the regular prison population were to decline, which is still
hasn't, there i s this large unmined population, undocumented immigrants,
and even documented immigrants with a criminal conviction who we want
to detain.

And, if you are looking at their profit reports, they were

absolutely correct.

So, it's a great move strategically for them to support

this type of legislation. So I am concerned that they' re frustrated, whether
correct or not, that there is somebody w h o is truly benefiting from these
laws.
PRO � ESSOR ANDREA ARMSTRONG (MODERATOR] : Okay, so should

we start with Professor Diamond and then close with Professor Kusuda?
PROFESSOR RAYMOND T. DIAMOND: I will return to a theme that

� at l �ast a couple of times, and simply ask this question: if on

I've mentione

one lev�l, Anzona s real concerns are legitimate, that is, its concern with
the pubhc fisc, the question is, "what should Arizona do about it?"
The most recent comm�nts sugg est that
that cost may not be as high as
.
.
Anzon� w� me � .
hat I will sugg est i s that the debate
w e need to have
about ummgrahon is a debate th at
nee d s to tak e a place m the pohtt cal

�

·

·

·

1 84. See Laura Sullivan Prison Econo
·
m ics
He/p Drive
·
Arizon
·
a Immigration law. NAT'L PUB.
(Oct. 28, 2 0 1 0) http.//www.npr.org/templa
tes/story/story.php?storyld= 1 3083 3 74 1 &ps=cpr.

RADIO

·

,

·
'
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branches of government, at the federal level . I t ' s a debate which has b egun,

and this conversation we're having today is part of it.
I'm not inclined as to disagree with W i l l Rogers that "this country has

come to feel the same when Congr ess is in session as when the baby gets

hold of a hammer," 1 85 but I do believe tha t when Congress has access to

information, we can at least ask it to make an intell igent decision.

PROFESSOR INGRID EAGLY: I think the last question from Dean
Deml eitner is an important one.

I do think that correctional policies and

funding streams can potentially shape enforcement priorities.

For example, there is a question, as Dean D emleitner highlights, as to
whether the federal or state government will bear the i ncarceration costs for
undocumented defendants. Since 1 996, we have had a federal program that
reimburses localities for a portion of the correctional expenses incurred with

holding certain undocumented persons for a minimum number of days.

So, there are built-in financial incentives for states.
receive

1 86

Namely, they can

a reimbursement by incarcerating persons who qualify under the

program for at least four days. 1 87 Whether these incentives play out in
practice is an important area for future research.
The Travis County, Texas data that we d iscussed earlier are also
relevant to Dean Demleinter' s question.
In Travis County, researchers
found that enforcement patterns did in fact shift when Travis County
.
" 1 88
i. mpIemented the so-called "Criminal Aben Program " or "CAP .
CAP is
·

a federally funded program that involves localities in screening arrestees for
immigration status . 1 89 A s the study by the Warren Institute at Berkeley
-

demonstrated, after the program was implemen ted in Irving, Texas, arrests
1 90
of Latmo
. s for petty offenses increased dramatlca
. 11 y.
PROFESSOR BILL ONG HING: I'm sorry
picking on you.

if I sounded

like

l was

PROFESSOR HIROKO KUSUDA: l should have supplemented my
earlier comment on this matter. I have to give a little more credit to the
U.S. Congress in passing trafficking a bill, Violence Against Women Act,

1 ( 1 979).
1 85 . LAU RENC E J. PETER, PETER 'S QUOTATIONS : IDEAS FOR OUR TIME 22

1 86. 8 U.S.C. § 1 23 1 (i) (2006).

�:o�

MATIO N ON CRI
1 87. U.S. Gov' T ACCO UNTA BILITY OFFIC E, GA0-05-3 37R, INFOR
13 (
SONS AND LOCAL J A I L

ALI ENS INCARCERATED

JN FEDERAL AND

STATE

PRI

�

Report_Ap nl200 S.pdf.
http ://www.govem or.state.az.us/documents/B orderSecu rity/I CAIF SPLJ_
1 88. Guttin, supra note 1 4 5 .

1 89. Id.

1 90. Gardner & Kohli, supra note 143.
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�

which gives relief to certain victims of trafficking and victin s o f

� rime : 1 " 1

Also there has been a recent Department o f Justice 's effort i n gomg a f ter

�

�

orkcrs, especially
employers who benefit from trafficking and abus ng
1 92
But these efforts have to substantial ly mcrcasc awarem:ss
H2-B workers.

�

so that people w i l l understand what kind of cruel treatment c m l o yccs have
been subjected to, and a relief the immigrant workers arc entitled.

In our

clinic we represent immigrant workers who were trafficked and abused.

I

totally agree with you, and both civil and criminal wrongdoings o n the part
of the employer should be punished.
think

I

closing,

In

the

most

clement

troublesome

of

state

criminalization of immigrants, is the fact that immigrants arc not commonly
savvy or "street smart." When they are arrested on the street, they con fess.
or they make incriminating statements because they arc a fraid and they
believe they are not entitled to an attorney to consult, they don 't know they
don't have to say anything. So their statem ents come back and haunt them
in the subsequent immigration proceedings, because such statements arc
almost always considered admissible e vidence by most i m m i gration judges.
Moreover, noncitizens arc not entitled to appo inted counse l ; there fore. they
are placed in the most difficult situation . Arresting imm igrants w h o arc not
familiar with the American criminal j ustice system and i l lega l ly obtaining
information that incriminates them, without giving them a tool to defend
is

themselves,
jurisdictions.
Congress

the

aspect of this

attempt

by

local

I think that this problem c o ntinues unless or un til one day

decides

proceedings.

most troublesome
to

appoint

counsel

nonc itizcns

in

I think that these u nrepresented people

i m migration

who

represent

themselves in the adversarial immigration court proceedings face a very
difficult task, and that' s the reason why we make a monthly visit to
immigration detention center, to empower them in a li mited capacity that
we have, to let them know these are your rights. But someti m e s i t ' s too late
by the time we talk to them, so I sincerely hope that the state of Louisiana
will not follow Arizo na ' s lead.

���

�

PR F S O R A DREA

�RMSTRONG

[MODERATOR) : Wel l . I hope

that you 11 JOIIl m e m thankmg Professor Medina and students with the
Jou

�al

of Publ i c Interest Law, Loyola University New Orleans, its staff

and its students who helped make this s ymposium possible.

�

And last, but

not least, our exp rt panelists who brought all of their expertise to bear on
some very, very difficult questions, so thank you very much.

1 9 1 . 1 8 U.S.C.A . § 22 6 1 (West 20J I ).
1 92. Florida Couple Pleadf Guilty to
�orced L ahor C onspiracy o/ 39 Filipino Guest Workers.
F ED. BUREA U OF INVESTJGATION (Se t
1 7 20 \ 0) ' h ttp://miam J.tb1.gov/dojprcssrc
p
l/pressrel I O
mb09 I 7 1 O.htm.
'
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APPENDIX

Regular Session, 20 I 0
HOUSE BILL NO. 1 205
BY REPRESENTATIVE HARRISON
EMPLOYMENT: Creates the Louisiana Taxpayer and Citizen Protection
Act of 2010
AN ACT
To enact Chapter 2 1 of Title 49 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of
1 950, to be comprised of R.S. 49 : 1 3 1 1 through 1 323, relative to
immigration; to provide for the determination of citizenship status for
persons charged with certain crimes; to provide for verification of persons
determined to be a foreign national; to provide for time limitation for
verification; to provide for notification to certain entities; to provide for
rebuttable presumption that certain persons are a flight risk; to provide for
participation in certain verification system; to provide fo r establishing
certain discriminatory practice; to provide for requiring agencies and
political subdivisions to verify lawful presence of persons applying for
certain benefits; to provide for nondiscriminatory treatment; to require
certain applicants to be verified through the Systematic Alien Verification
for Entitlement Program; to require certain entities to monitor certain
program; to require publication of annual report and certain
recommendations; to require certain entities to submit a report of errors to
certain agency ; to require certain withholding of state income tax under
certain circumstances; to provide relative to postsecondary education; to
direct the Attorney General to negotiate terms of certain memorandum; to
prohibit certain actions by government entities; to provide for establishing a
Fraudulent Documents Identification Unit within the Departmen t of Public
Safety subject to availability of funding; to provide for a purpose; to
provide for employment of sufficient employe es; and to provide for related
matters.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana:
Section 1 . Chapter 2 1 of Title 49 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of
1 950, comprised of R.S. 49: 1 3 1 1 through 1 323, is hereby enacted to read
as follows :
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CHAPTER 2 1 . THE LOUI SIANA TAXPAYER AND C ITIZEN
PROTECTION ACT OF 20 1 0

PART I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
§ 1 3 1 1 . Title

This Chapter may be cited as the "Louisiana Taxpayer and C itizen
Protection Act".
§ 13 1 2. Legislative intent

The state o f Louisiana finds that illegal immigration i s causing
economic hardship and l awlessness in this state and that illegal immigration
is encouraged when public agencies within this state provide public benefits
without verifying immigration status. The state of Louisiana further finds
that when illegal immigrants have been harbored and sheltered in this state
and encouraged to reside in this state through the issuance o f identification
cards that are issued w ithout verifying immigration status, these practices
impede and obstruct the enforcement o f federal immigration law,
undermine the security of our borders, and impermissibly restrict the
privileges and immunities of the citizens of Louisiana. Therefore, the
people of the state o f Louisiana declare that it is a compel ling public
interest of this state to discourage i llegal immigration by requiring all
agencies within the state to fully c ooperate with federal immigration
authorities in the enforcement of federal immigration laws. The state of
Louisiana also finds that other measures are necessary to ensure the
integrity of various governmental programs and services.
§ 13 13. Definitions

As used in this Chapter the fol lowing terms shall have the definitions
ascribed in this Chapter unless context c learly requires otherwise:
( 1 ) "Public employer" means every department, agency, or
instrumentality of the state or a p ol itical subdivision of the state.
(2) "Subcontractor" means a subcontractor, contract employee,
staffing agency, or any contractor regardless of its tier.
(3) "Unauthorized alien" means an alien as defined in Section
l 324a(h)(3) of Title 8 of the United States Code.

20 1 1 ]
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PART I I . PUB LIC BENEFITS
§1314. Public benefits
A.

Except as provided in Subsection C of this Section or where
exempted

by

federal

law,

each

agency and

each

political

subdivision of this state shall verify the lawful presence in the
United States of any natural person fourteen years of age or older
who has applied for state or local public benefits, as defined in 8
U.S.C. 1 62 1 , or for federal public benefits, as defined in 8 U.S.C.
1 6 1 1 , that is administered by an agency or a political subdivision
of this state.

B.

The provisions of this Section shall be enforced without regard to
race, religion, gender, ethnicity, or national origin.

C.

Verification of lawful presence under the provisions of this
Section shall not be required:
(1)

For any purpose for which lawful presence in the United
States is not restricted by law, ordinance, or regulation.

(2)

For assistance for health care items and services that are
necessary

for the

treatment

condition, as defined in
involved

and are

not

42

of an emergency

medical

U. S.C. 1 396b(v)(3), of the alien

related

to

an

organ

transplant

procedure.
(3)

(4)

For short-term, noncash, in-kind emergency disaster relief.
For public health assistance for immunizations with respect
to diseases and for testing and treatment of symptoms of
communicable diseases whether or not such symptoms are
caused by a communicable disease.

(5)

For programs, services, or assistance such as soup kitchens,
crisis counseling and intervention, and short-term shelter

specifie d by the United States attorney general , in the sole
and unreviewable discreti on of the United States attorney
s
general after consultation with appropriate federal agencie
and departments whic h:
in-kind

services

at

the

community

level,

(a)

Deliver

(b)

not condition the provision of assistance, the
amount of assistance provided, or the cost of assistance

including through public or private nonprofit agencies.
Do
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provided on the income or resources of the indi vidual
recipient.
(c)
D.

Are necessary for the protection of life or safety .

(1) Verification of lawful presence in the United State� by �he
agency or political subdivision required to make s � ch ven ficat10n
shall require that the applicant execute an affidavit under penalty
of perjury that:
(a)

He is a United States citizen.

(b)

He is a qualified alien under the federal Immigration
and Nationality Act and is lawfully present in the
United States.

(2) The agency or political subdivision providing the state or
local public benefits shall provide notary public services at no
cost to the applicant.
E.

For any applicant who has executed the affidavit described in
Subparagraph ( 1 )(b) of Subsection D of this Section, eligibility
for benefits shall be verified through the Systematic Alien
Verification for Entitlements (SA VE) Program operated by the
United States Department o f Homeland Security or an equivalent
program designated by the U nited States Department of
Homeland Security. Until such e ligibility verification is made, the
affidavit may be presumed to b e proof of lawful presence for the
purposes of this Section.

F.

Any person who knowingly and willfully makes a false,
fictitious, or fraudulent statement of representation in an affidavit
executed pursuant to Subsection D of this Section shall be subject
to criminal penalties applicable in this state for fraudulently
obtaining public assistance program benefits. If the affidavit
constitutes a false claim of U . S . citizenship under 1 8 U.S.C. 9 1 1 ,
a complaint shall be filed b y the agency requiring the affidavit
with the United States attorney general for the applicable district
based upon the venue in which the affidavit was executed.

G.

Agencies or political subdivisions of this state may adopt
variations to the requirements of the provisions o f this Section
which demonstrably improve the e fficiency or reduce delay in the
verification process, or to provide for adjudication of unique
individual circumstances where the verification procedures in this
Section would impose unusual hardship on a legal resident of
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Louisiana.
H.

It shall be unlawful for any agency or a political subdivisio n of
this state to provide any state, local, or federal benefit, as defined
in 8 U.S.C. 1 62 1 , or 8 U . S . C . 1 6 1 1 , i n violation of the provisions

of this Sectio n.
I.

Each state agency or department which administers any program
of state or local public benefits shall provide an annual report to
the governor, the president pro tempore of the Senate and the
speaker of the House of Representatives with respect to its
compliance with the provisions o f this Section. Each agency or
department shall monitor the Systematic Alien Verification for
Entitlements

Program for application verification

errors and

significant delays and shall provide an annual public report on
such errors and significant delays and recommendations to ensure
that the appl ication of the Systematic Alien Verification of
Entitlements Program is not erroneously denying benefits to legal
residents of Louisiana. Errors shall a l so be reported to the United
States Department of Homeland Security by each agency or
department.

PART III. CRIMINAL
§1315. Crimi nal: booking of arrested person, submission of booking
information summary; citizenship, immigration status
A.

It is the duty o f every peace o fficer making an arrest, or having an
arrested person in his custody, promptly to conduct the person
arre sted to the nearest jail or police station and cause him to be
boo ked .

B.

A person is booke d by an entry , i n a book kept for that purpose,
from
showing his name and addre ss, a l i s t of any prope rty ta�en
.
of a
n
1ss1o
subm
him, the date and time o f book ing, and the
Para�raph
booking information summary as provided fo� in
poh ce or Jail
of this Sect ion to the person mak ing the entry m the
a boo� for the
book . Ever y jail and polic e stati on shall k�ep
ner rece ived . The
listing of the above info rma tion as t o ea� h pnso
shall alw ays be open
book and boo king info rma tion summanes
shal l be imprisoned
for pub lic insp ectio n. The pers on booked
unless he is released on bail.

��)

C.

causing the arrested
( I ) At the tim e of boo king , the pea ce officer
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person to be booked shall deliver to the person at t c j � il or pol icc
_
station who accepts custody of the arrestee a book mg m fo� atton

�

summary which shall include at least the following in formation:
( a)

The proper legal name o f the arrestee, if known.

(b)

The charge or charges upon which the

( c)

A short recitation o f the facts or events which caused

person

was

arrested and the name of the person making the arrest.

the defendant to be arrested.
( d)

The names of all other persons arrested as a result of
the same events or facts .

(2)

If the peace officer presenting an arrestee for booking is
unable to submit a complete booking information summary,
he shall provide the person receiving custody of the arrestee
a written statement or form,

explaining why a complete

booking information summary cannot be presented.

D.

( 1 ) At the time of booking, the peace officer causing the arrested
person to be booked shall attempt to determine the citizenship or
immigration status of the person being booked.

(2)

If the arrested person is a foreign national, the peace officer
shall make a reasonable effort to verify that the person has
lawfully

been

admitted

the

into

United

If the

States .

verification of lawful status cannot be determined from
documents in the possession of the arrested person, the
peace

officer shall attempt

to notify the

United

States

Department of Homeland S e curity as soon as i s practicabl e .

E.

The office of state police shall be responsible for investigating
and apprehending persons

or

entities that participate

in the

manufacture, sale, or distribution of fraudulent documents used
for identification purposes, including but not limited to fraudulent
identification documents prepared for persons who are unlawfully
residing within the state of Louisiana. The office of state police is
hereby authorized to create a unit devoted to such investigations
by rule

promulgated

in accordance with the

Administrative

Procedure Act.

§1316. Unlawful h arboring, concealing, or sheltering of an alien
A.

It shall be unlawful for any person to harbor, conceal, or shelter
from

detection any alien

in

any

place within

the

state of
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including

any

building,

when

423
the

offender

has

knowledge of the fact that the alien has entered or remained i n the
United States in violation o f law and if either of the following
occur:

(l )

The offender has the intent of assisting the alien i n eluding a
federal, state, or local

law

e nforcement agency, or the

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Bureau.
(2)

The offender has the intent of assisting the alien i n avoiding
or escaping arrest, trial, conviction, or punishment.

B.

For the purposes of this Section, "alien" has the same meaning as
defined

in

the

Immigration

and

8

Nationality Act,

U.S.C.

l 1 0 l (a)( 3 ) .
C.

Nothing in this Section shall b e construed so as to prohibit or
restrict the provision of any state or local public benefit described
in 8 U . S . C . 1 62 1 ( b), or regulated public health services provided
by a private charity using private funds.

D.

(1)

Whoever

commits

the

crime

of unlawfully

harboring,

concealing, or sheltering an alien o n a first conviction shall be
fined not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned for not
more than six months, or both.
(2)

Whoever

commits

the

crime

of unlawfully

harboring,

concealing, or sheltering an alien on a second or subsequent
conviction shall be

fined not more than

two

thousand

dollars, or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
E.

The following shall be affirm ative d efenses to prosec ution under
this Sect ion:
(l )

�

esi�nated
The perso n was prov iding hum anitarian aid as a
h ts tax
whic
representative of a nonp rofit organization
the Internal
exempt pursuant to Sect ion 5 0 l ( c)(3) of
Revenue Code.

(2)

?

The person was the attorney or his d�signe� , o� su�h ot er
persons authorized to represent clients m immigrat10n
matters pursuant to 8 C.F .R. 1 292. 1 , or their designe� , and
who was assisting the alien and providing representation to
the alien in the course and scope of the attorney ' s or other
authorized representative ' s employment.
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§1317. Unlawful transportation of a n alien
A.

It shall be unlawful for any person to transport, move, or attempt
to transport in the state of Louisiana any alien, knowing or in
reckless disregard of the fact that the alien has entered or
remained in the United States in violation of law, in furtherance
of the illegal presence of the alien i n the United States .

B.

For the purposes of this Section, "alien" has the same meaning as
defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U . S.C.
l 1 0 l (a)(3).

C.

Nothing in this Section shall be c onstrued so as to prohibit or
restrict the provision of any state or local public benefit described
in 8 U.S.C. 1 62 1 (b), or regulated public health services provided
by a private charity using private funds.

D.

( 1 ) Whoever commits the crime of unlawfully transporting an
alien on a first conviction shall be fined not more than one
thousand dollars, or imprisoned for not more than six months, or
both.
(2)

E.

Whoever commits the crime of unlawfully transporting an
alien on a second or subsequent conviction shall be fined not
more than two thousand dollars, or imprisoned, with or
without hard labor, for not more than one year, or both.

The fo llowing shall be affirmative defenses to prosecution under
this Section:
(1)

The person was providing humanitarian aid a s a designated
representative of a nonprofit organization which is tax
exempt pursuant to Section 5 0 l (c)(3) o f the Internal
Revenue Code.

(2) The person was the attorney or his designee, or such other
persons authorized to represent clients in immigration
matters �ursuant �o 8 C.F .R. 1 292. 1 , or other designee,
representmg the ahen and who was transporting the alien in
the course and scope of the attorney's or other authorized
representative's employment.
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PART IV. STATUS VERIFICATION

§1318 Status Verification
A.

Verification

"Status

means

System"

an

system

electronic

operated by the federal government, through which an authorized
offiGial of an agency of the state of Louisiana or of a political
subdivision therein may make an inquiry, by exercise of authority
delegated pursuant to Section 1 3 73 of Title 8 of the United States
Code, to verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration status
of any individual within the jurisdiction of the agency for any
purpose

authorized by Part V

of this Chapter.

The

Status

Verification System shall be deemed to include:

(I)

The electronic verification o f work authori zation program of
the

Illegal

Refonn

Immigration

Responsibility Act of 1 996,

P.L.

I m migration

and

1 04-208,

D i v i sion C,

Section 403(a); 8 U . S .C. 1 3 24a, and operated by the Un ited
States Department of Homeland Security, known as the
Basic P ilot Program.

(2)

Any equivalent federal program designated by the United
States Department

of Homel and Security

or

any

other

federal agency authorized to verify the work eligibi lity
status

of

newly

h ired

employees,

pursuant

to

the

Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1 986 ( IRCA), 0.L.
99-603 .
(3)

Any other independent, third-party system with an equal or
higher degree of reliab i lity a s the programs, systems, or
processes described i n thi s Section.

(4)

The Social Security Number Verification Service, or such
s i m ilar

online verification

process

implemented

by the

United States Social Security A dministration.
B.

The

follow ing

entities

may

create,

publish

or

otherwise

card, or
manu factu re an identi ficati on document, identi ficati on
plate or
ident ificat ion certificate and may p ossess an engraved
ided,
prov
ion;
ificat
other such devic e for the print ing o f such ident
ed upon the
the nam e of the issui ng entity shal l be c learly print
face of the identification:

(I)

, serv ice organ i�ations
B u sine sses , compani es, corp orat ions
ernmental age ncie s for
and federal, state and loca l gov
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employee identification which is designed to identify the
bearer as an employee.
(2)

serv ice
and
corporations
companies,
Busine sses,
organizations for custome r identification which is designed
to i dentify the bearer as a customer or member.

(3)

Federal, state, and local government agenc ies for purposes
authorized or required by law or any legitlmate purpose
consistent with the duties of such an agency, including, but
not l imited to, voter identification cards, driver licenses,
nondriver identification cards, passports, birth ccrti ficates
and social security cards.

(4)

Any public school or state or private educational institution,
as defined by Title 1 7 o f the Louisiana Statutes of 1 950, to
identify the bearer as an administrator, faculty member,
student or employee.

(5)

Any professional organization or labor union to identify the
bearer as a member of the professional organization or labor
um on.

(6)

Businesses, companies or corporations which manufacture
medical-alert identification for the wearer thereof.

C.

All identification documents as provided for in Paragraph (3) and
(4) of Subsection B of this Section shall be issued only to United
States citizens, nationals and legal p ermanent resident aliens.

D.

The provisions of Subsection C of this Section shall not apply
when an applicant presents, in person, valid documentary
evidence of:
(1)

A valid, unexpired immigrant or nonimmigrant visa status
for admission into the United States.

(2)

A pending or approved application for asylum in the United
States.

(3)

Admission into the United States in refugee status.

(4)

A pending or approved application for temporary protected
status in the United States.

(5)

Approved deferred actio n statu s.

(6)

A pend ing application for adj ustment of statu
s to legal
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permanent residence status or conditional resident status.
Upon approval, the applicant may be issued an identification
docume?t

provided

for

in

Paragraph

(3) and (4) of

S ubsection B of this Section. Such identification document
shall

be

valid only

during

the

period of time

of the

authorized stay of the appl icant in the United States or, if
the e is no definite end to the period of authorized stay, a
�
penod of one ( I ) year. Any identification document issued
pursuant to the provisions of this subsection shall clearly
indicate that it is temporary and shall state the date that the
identification

document

expires.

Such

identification

document may be renewed only upon presentation of valid
documentary evidence that the status by which the applicant
qualified for the identification document has been extended
by the U nited States Citizenship and Immigration Services
or other authorized agency of the United States Department
of Homeland Security.
E.

The provisions of Subsection B of this Section shal l not apply to
an

identification

document

described

in

Paragraph

(4) of

Subsection B of this Section that is only valid for use on the
campus or faci lity of that educational institution and includes a
statement of such restricted val idity clearly and conspicuously
printed upon the face of the identification document.
F.

Any driver license issued to a person who is not a United States
citizen, national or legal permanen t resident alien for which an
application has been made for renewa l, duplication or reissuance

shall be presumed to have been i ssued in accordance with the
pro visions o f S ubsection D o f thi s Section; provid ed that, at the
time the appl ication is made, the drivers license has not expired,

or been cance lled, suspended or revoked. The requi rements of
al,
Subsection D o f this Sectio n s ha l l apply, however, to a renew
y is
dupli c ation or reissuance i f the Department of Publi c Safet
en y of
notifie d b y a local, state, or federal govemmen� a� �
atmg a
info rmation i n the poss essio n of the agency md1c
such renew� !,
reas onab l e susp icion that the i n d i vidu al seeking
_
Umt ed States m
dupl icat ion or reissuance is pres ent in the
. n shal l not pply
�
violation o f law . The provisio ns o f this Subsect10
dent
resi
t
anen
perm
l
lega
or
,
to Uni ted Stat es citizens, n atio nals
aliens.
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PART V. PUBLIC EMPLOYERS

§1319. Public employers
A.

Every public employer shall register with and utilize a Status
Verification System as described i n R.S. 49: 1 3 1 7 o f this Chapter
to verify the federal employment authorization status of all new
employees.

B.

( 1 ) After July 1, 20 l 0, no public employer shall enter into a
contract for the physical performance of services within this state
unless the contractor registers and participates in the Status
Verification System to verify the work eligibility status o f all new
employees.

C.

(2)

After July 1 , 20 10, no contractor or subcontractor who
enters into a contract with a public employer shall enter into
such a contract or subcontract in connection with the
physical performance o f services within this state unless the
contractor or subcontractor registers and participates in the
Status Verification System to verify information of all new
employees.

(3)

The provisions of this Subsection shall not apply to any
contracts entered into prior to the effective date of this
Section even though such contracts may involve the physical
performance of services within this state after July 1 , 20 10 .

( 1 ) It shall be a discriminatory practice for an employing entity to
discharge an employee working i n Louisiana who is a United
States citizen or permanent resident alien while retaining an
employee who the employing entity knows, or reasonably should
have known, is an unauthorized alien hired after July 1 , 20 1 0, and
who i s working in Louisiana in a job category that requires equal
skill, effort, and responsibility, and which is performed under
similar working conditions, as defined by 29 U.S.C. 206(d)( l ), as
the j ob category held by the discharged employee .
(2)

An employing entity which, on the date of the discharge in
question, was currently enrolled in and used a Status
Verification System to verify the employment eligibility of
its employees in Louisiana hired after July 1 , 2 0 1 0 , shall be
exempt from liability, investigation, or suit arising from any
action under this Section.

(3)

No cause of action for a violation of this Section shall arise
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anywhere in Louisiana law but from the provisions of this
subsection.

PART V I . CONTRACTORS
§1320. Contractors; withholding of i n c o m e tax on compensation paid to
alien contractors
A.

In conformity with the Louisiana Taxpayer and Citizen Protection
Act, a contracting entity shall b e required to withhold individual
income

tax

from

the

compensation

paid

to

an

individual

independent contractor who is contracting for the performance of
services in this state and who fai l s to provide to the contracting
documentation

entity

verifying

the

contractor's

independent

employment authorization, pursuant to the prohibition against the
use of unauthorized alien labor through contracts set forth in 8
U . S . C . 1 3 24(a)(4). The withhol d i ng of taxes shall apply to all
compensation which exceeds the amount of compensation the
contracting entity is required to report as income on United States
Internal Revenue Service Form 1 099. The rate of withholding
shall be the maximum marginal income tax rate as provided in
R.S. 47:32(A)(3), without any exemptions.
B.

Any contracting entity fail i ng to comply with the withholding
requirements of this Section shall b ecome personally l iable for
such tax in addition to any applicable interest, penalties and
attorney fees. The tax, interest, penalties, and attorney fees shall
be payable as provided in this Chapter, the amount of which may
be determined, computed, and c o l l ected by any method generally
provided for in this Chapter. However, the provisions of this
Subsection shall not apply to a c o ntracting entity which is exempt
from

federal

withholding

pro v i s ions

with

respect

to

such

individual i ndependent contractor pursuant to a properly filed
Internal Revenue Service Form 8233 or its equivalent.
C.

Nothing

in

construed
between

this Section
as

a

contractor.

creating,

is

intended to create,

an

contracting entity

�

or sho uld
e
.
employer-employee relat10nsh1p
and an individual

independent
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PART VII. HIGHER EDUCATION
§1321. Higher education

A.

In addition to any other powers and duties authorized by Title 1 7
of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1 950, each postsecondary
system management board may adopt a policy that al lows a
graduate of a public or approved nonpublic high school to qualify
for that tuition and mandatory attendance fee amounts at an
institution under its supervision and management shall be equal
to tuition and mandatory attendance fee amounts applicable to
students who are residents o f Louisiana at such an institution i f
the student resided in the state while attending classes at a public
or approved nonpublic high school for at least two years prior to
graduation.

B.

If

student

the

cannot

present

to

institution

the

valid

documentation of United States nationality or an immigration
status permitting study at the institution, he shall neverthe less be
eligible for resident tuition and mandatory fee amounts i f docs
one of the following:
( a)

He provides to the institution a copy of a true and correct
app l ic ation

or

Citizenship

and

petition

filed

Immigration

with

United

the

Services

to

States

legalize

his

immigration status.
(b)

Files an affidavit with the institution stating that he will file
an application to legalize h i s

immigration

status at the

earliest time he is eligible to do so, provided that such time
is no later than the later of the fo llowing:
(i)

One year after the date on which the student enrolls for
study at the institution.

(ii)

If there is no formal process to permit children of
parents without lawful immigration status to apply for
lawful status without risk of deportation, one year after
the date the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services provides such a formal process.

C.

Any s

�dent

who completes the required criteria prescribed in

Subsect10n(B) of the Section shall not be disqualified on the basis
his immigration status from any scholarship or financial aid
provided b y the state.
D.

The provisions of this Section shall not impose any additional
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conditions to maintain resident tuition status at a Louisiana public
postsecondary education institution who was enrolled in a degree
program and first received such resident tuition status at that
institution prior to the 20 1 0-20 1 1 school year.

PART VIII. GOVERNMENT AL ENTITIES
§1322. Memorandum of understanding; local ordin ance prohibited;
right of action
A.

The attorney general is authorized and directed to negotiate the
terms of a Memorandum of Understanding between the state of
Louisiana and the United States Department of Justice or the
United States Department of Homel and Security, as provided by
Section 1 3 57(g) of Title 8 of the United States Code, concerning
the

enforcement of federal

detention

and

removals,

immigration

and

and

i n vestigations

customs

in

the

laws,

state of

Louisiana.
B.

The

Memorandum of Understanding negotiated

pursuant to

Subsection A of this Section shall be signed on behalf of this state
by the attorney general and the governor or as otherwise required
by the appropriate federal agency.
C.

No local government, whether acting through its governing body
or by an initiative, referendum, or any other process, shall enact
any ordinance or policy that limits or prohibits a law enforcement
officer,

local

official,

or

local

government

employee

from

communicating or cooperating with federal offic ials with regard
to the immigration status of any person within this state.
D.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no government
entity or o fficial within the State o f Louisiana may proh i bit, or in
any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending
to, or receiving from, the United S tates Department o f Homeland
Security, i nformation regarding the citizenship or immigration
status, lawful or unlawful, o f any individual.

E.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person or agency

may prohibit, or in any way restrict, a p� blic e � ployce fr? m
doing any o f the following with respect to mformatlon regarding
the immigration status, lawful o r unlawful, of any individual:
(1)

Sending such information to, o r requesting o r receiving such
information

from,

the

United

States

Department

of

Loyola Journal of Public Interest Law

432

[Vol.

12

Homeland Security;

F.

(2)

Maintaining such information; or

( 3)

Exchanging such information with any other federal, state.
or local government entity.

The provisions of this Section shall allow for a private right of
action by any natural or legal person lawfully domiciled in this
state to file for a writ of mandamus to compel any non
cooperating local or state governmental agency to comply with
such reporting laws.

PART IX. FRAUDULENT DOCUMENTS IDENTIFICATION UNIT
§1323. Fraudulent documents identification

Subject to the availability of funding, the Department of Public Safety
shall establish a Fraudulent Documents Identification (FDI) Unit for the
primary purpose of investigating and apprehending persons or entities that
participate in the sale or distribution o f fraudulent documents used for
identification purposes. The unit shall additionally specialize in fraudulent
identification documents created and prepared for persons who arc
unlawfully residing within the state of Louisiana. The department shall
employ sufficient employees to investigate and implement an FDI Unit.

Section 2. This Act shall become effective July l , 20 1 0 .

